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ABSTRACT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against an employee “because of” race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. This seems simple enough, but if an
employer makes an adverse employment decision partly for an
impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason, i.e., if the
employer acts with a mixed motive, has the employer acted “because of”
the impermissible reason? According to Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc.1 and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,2 the
answer is no. The Courts in Gross and Nassar held that proving that an
employer acted “because of” an impermissible reason requires proving
“but for” causation, which means proving that the employer acted “solely
because of” an impermissible reason. A United States Senator who
participated in the debates surrounding the enactment of Title VII said, “If
anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a
different kind of animal from any I know of.”
On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court decided Bostock v. Clayton
County3 and held that an employer that terminates an employee because
the employee is gay or transgender violates Title VII’s prohibition against
sex discrimination. But that is not all Bostock4 did. At several points in the
opinion, the Court held a Title VII plaintiff proves her employer acted
“because of” an impermissible reason and proves “but for” causation even
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1. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
2. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013).
3. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
4. See, e.g., id. at 1739, 1741–46, 1748.
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in cases where the employer acted with a mixed motive, so long as an
impermissible reason was one of those motives, and the impermissible
reason was decisive. Bostock thus departed from Gross and Nassar in its
framing of what “but for” causation means in Title VII cases.
This Article posits that Bostock articulated a new mixed motive
theory that allows a Title VII plaintiff to prove “but for” causation in cases
where the employer acted partly for an impermissible reason and partly
for a permissible reason so long as the impermissible reason was decisive.
Under this view of Bostock, it is now easier for a plaintiff whose employer
acted with a mixed motive to prove “but for” causation and receive the full
panoply of Title VII remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
If an employer makes an adverse employment decision partly for an
impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason, i.e., if the
employer acts with a mixed motive, has the employer acted “because of”
the impermissible reason? For example, if an employer declines to
promote a female employee because she is abrasive and because she does
not dress sufficiently “feminine,” did the employer discriminate against
the employee “because of sex”? In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, six
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Justices on the Supreme Court of the United States said yes,5 and in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act),6 Congress codified this aspect of the
Price Waterhouse holding. Under the 1991 Act, however, employers that
prove they would have made the same decision had the impermissible
reason played no role in the decision are liable, but not for damages, and
they cannot be ordered to admit, reinstate, hire, promote, or pay the
employee.7
In the aftermath the 1991 Act, a Title VII plaintiff has two ways to
prove her employer violated the law: one, she can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that her employer made an adverse
employment decision “because of” race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin;8 or two, she can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her
employer was motivated by “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”
in making an adverse employment decision.9
If a Title VII plaintiff proceeds under the theory that her employer
discriminated “because of” an impermissible reason, she has to prove that
the causal link between the employer’s adverse employment decision and
her injury is so close that her injury would not have occurred “but for” her
employer’s discriminatory motive,10 and in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.11 and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar,12 the Supreme Court effectively held that this requires proving that
the employer acted solely because of an impermissible reason. This is very
difficult to do as evidenced by this quote from United States Senator
Clifford Philip Case, Jr., of New Jersey, who participated in the debates
surrounding the enactment of Title VII: “If anyone ever had an action that
was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal from any
I know of.”13
If a Title VII plaintiff proceeds under the theory that her employer
was motivated by an impermissible reason in making an adverse
employment decision, she does not need to prove that her injury would not
have occurred but for her employer’s discriminatory motive. Rather, she
only needs to prove that her employer’s adverse employment decision was

5. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion); id. at 259–60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 279 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
10. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343, 348 (2013).
11. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–78 (2009).
12. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343.
13. 110 Cong. Rec. 13837 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clifford Philip Case, Jr.).
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motivated by a discriminatory motive.14 The Court describes this as a
“lessened causation standard,” which means a Title VII plaintiff can obtain
some relief, albeit limited, if she proves that her employer acted partly for
an impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason and her
employer proves that it would have made the same decision had the
impermissible reason played no role at all.15
Because the relief available to a plaintiff who proceeds under a
“motivating factor” theory is so limited, Title VII plaintiffs have an
incentive to proceed under the “because of” theory. However, doing so
means the plaintiff loses if the employer successfully demonstrates that it
acted with a mixed motive rather than a single motive.16
Employers have incentives too. When a plaintiff alleges an employer
made an adverse employment decision “because of” race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, the employer can defeat the plaintiff’s claim by
arguing other permissible reasons played a role too. Therefore, the
impermissible reason was not a “but for” reason for the decision. If the
employer succeeds in making this argument, the plaintiff who proceeded
under the “because of” theory loses.
On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court decided Bostock v. Clayton
County and held that an employer that terminates an employee because the
employee is gay or transgender violates Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination.17 But that is not all Bostock did. At several points in the
opinion, the Court said a Title VII plaintiff proves her employer acted
“because of” an impermissible reason even in cases where the employer
acted with a mixed motive, so long as an impermissible reason was one of
those motives, and the impermissible reason was decisive.18 Bostock thus
departed from Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. and University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar in its framing of what but
for causation means in Title VII cases and what a plaintiff proceeding
under a because of theory has to prove.19
This Article posits that Bostock articulated a new mixed motive
theory that allows Title VII plaintiffs to proceed under a “because of”
14. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)
(plurality opinion); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259–60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 279
(O’Connor, J., concurring); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
15. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343. A prevailing plaintiff in a mixed motive case can obtain declaratory
relief, certain injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs that are “directly attributable only to the
pursuit of [the] [mixed motive] claim,” however, her employer is not liable for damages, nor can it be
ordered to admit, reinstate, hire, promote, or pay the plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
16. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
17. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
18. See, e.g., id. at 1739, 1741, 1744–46, 1748.
19. Compare id. at 1739, 1741, 1744-1746, 1748, with Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.
167, 176–78 (2009), with Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348–50.
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theory in cases where the employer acted partly for an impermissible
reason and partly for a permissible reason so long as the impermissible
reason was decisive.20 If this understanding of Bostock is correct, two
mixed motive theories are now available under Title VII: one where the
impermissible motive was decisive, in which case the plaintiff can prove
“but for” causation and is eligible for the full panoply of Title VII
remedies,21 and one where the impermissible motive was not decisive, in
which case the plaintiff cannot prove “but for” causation, but is eligible
for a limited form of declaratory and injunctive relief.22 Under this view
of Bostock, it is now easier for a plaintiff whose employer acted with a

20. See generally Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1731. For other articles discussing Bostock and its
causation analysis, see Hillel J. Bavli, Causation in Civil Rights Legislation, 73 ALA. L. REV. 159
(2021) (examining the causation standard in antidiscrimination law and proposing legislation); Hillel
J. Bavli, Cause and Effect in Antidiscrimination Law, 106 IOWA L. REV. 483 (2021) (examining the
meaning of causation in antidiscrimination law, particularly in mixed-motive cases); Hillel J. Bavli,
Counterfactual Causation, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 879 (2019) (examining the meaning of but for causation,
discussing causation in mixed-motive cases, and proposing a causation standard that is consistent with
but for causation); William R. Corbett, Intolerable Asymmetry and Uncertainty: Congress Should
Right the Wrongs of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 419 (2021) (identifying “two
persistent problems [in employment discrimination law]: asymmetry regarding the applicable
causation standard and the closely related issue of uncertainty regarding applicable proof
frameworks[,]” and proposing amendments to the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination
Act “that would present Congress with a law that repairs much of the asymmetry and uncertainty in
employment discrimination law.”); Shirley Lin, Dehumanization “Because of Sex”: The Multiaxial
Approach to the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 731 (2020) (asserting that
“Title VII[‘s] causation doctrine [is] fraught with conceptual error and is statutorily inadequate
[because] [t]reating ‘sex’ as a binary, fixed, and homogenous classification misapprehends both actual
sex and what an aggrieved worker may articulate and ultimately prove.” The author proposes the use
of “multiaxial analysis,” which is “a framework with which judges and stakeholders identify the role
of Title VII’s protected traits as socially constructed along four axes: the aggrieved individual’s selfidentification, the defendant-employer, society, and the state.” Multiaxial analysis “has the potential
to give fuller effect to Title VII’s provisions and purposes as compared to sex-stereotyping theory or
the Court’s reformulated ‘but-for causation.’”); Paul W. Mollica, What’s on the Secret Title VII
Menu?: Proving “Motivating Factor” and “Same Action” Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 35 A.B.A.
J. LAB & EMP. L. 53 (2020) (encouraging more litigants to use Title VII’s motivating-factor theory
notwithstanding the limited relief available under that theory); Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing
and the Causation Standard After Comcast, 66 VILL. L. REV. 63 (2021) (detailing how Comcast’s “but
for” causation standard applies in cases filed under the 1968 Fair Housing Act); Sandra Sperino,
Comcast and Bostock Offer Clarity on Causation Standard, 46 HUM. RTS. 24, 24–25 (2021) (Bostock
“put . . . to rest” the notion that “but for” cause means “sole cause” or that “an outcome [can] only
have one ‘but for’ cause.”); Sandra Sperino, The Emerging Statutory Proximate Cause Doctrine, 99
NEB. L. REV. 285 (2020) (reviewing of “all of the discrimination cases invoking proximate cause
[since 2011] and [an exposé of] the chaotic, emerging statutory proximate cause doctrine.”); Kayla
King, Comment, Tenth Circuit Ruled in Favor of Sex-Plus Age Claims of Discrimination Under Title
VII in the Wake of Bostock v. Clayton County, 62 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT II 185 (2021) (touting
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s recognition of a Title VII claim based on
sex and age and positing that doing so is “sound policy and logically follows [Bostock]”).
21. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
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mixed motive to prove “but for” causation and receive the full panoply of
Title VII remedies.23
This Article is divided into two parts. Part I analyzes and discusses
the development of the Supreme Court’s causation doctrine under Title
23. There are a number of judicial decisions that can be read to support this view. Nathan v.
Great Lakes Water Auth., 992 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 2021) (district court dismissing a Title VII
sexual harassment claim because the harassers harassed the plaintiff because of her sex and her size.
The Sixth Circuit reversed based on Bostock’s language that “[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the
adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by
citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision.”). But see Pelcha v.
MW Bancorp, Inc., 988 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2021) (declining to apply Bostock’s but for causation
standard to Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) cases and applying Gross’s but
for causation standard instead); Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 50th Jud. Dist., 971 F.3d
416, 426-427 (3d Cir. 2020) (affirming a district court’s denial of qualified immunity for sexual
harassment claim and citing Bostock for the proposition that “[a]n employer violates Title VII if the
employee’s sex was one but-for cause of her disparate treatment”); Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black
Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1045–49 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that a sex-plus-age claim is cognizable
under Title VII even though age is not a prohibited basis for an employment decision under Title VII.
The Court based its holding on Bostock’s language that “so long as sex plays a role in the employment
action, it ‘has no significance’ that a factor other than sex ‘might also be at work,’ even if that other
factor ‘play[s] a more important role [than sex] in the employer’s decision.”); Black v. Grant Cnty.
Pub. Util. Dist., 820 F. App’x 547, 550–52 (9th Cir. 2020) (after the district court dismissed the
plaintiff’s ADEA and Title VII retaliation claims, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that under
Bostock, a plaintiff “need only show that his protected activity ‘was one but-for cause of [the adverse
employment] decision’”); Myers v. IHC Constr. Cos., No. 18-cv-4887, 2021 WL 1172740, at *8–11
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2021) (citing Bostock and Comcast, the district court denied a defendant’s motion
for summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 case, finding that a plaintiff can satisfy his or her burden
to prove “but for” causation in a § 1981 case by proving that his or her race was one “but for” cause
of the adverse decision); Flores v. Va. Dep’t of Corr., No. 5:20-cv-00087, 2021 WL 668802, at *6
(W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2021) (citing Bostock, the district court denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss a
Title VII disparate treatment sex-discrimination claim, finding that under Title VII, “a defendant
cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment
decision[, and] [s]o long as the plaintiff’s sex was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to
trigger the law”); Hill v. Big Horn Elementary Sch. Dist. 2 (Arrow Creek Elementary Sch. Dist.), No.
CV 20-42-BLG-SPW-TJC, 2021 WL 835524, at *5–6 (D. Mont. Feb. 16, 2021) (citing Bostock and
Comcast, the district court denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981
claims, finding that a plaintiff can satisfy his or her burden to prove “but for” causation in a § 1981
case by proving that his or her race was one “but for” cause of the adverse decision); Keller v. Hyundai
Motor Mfg., No. 2:19cv207-MHT, 2021 WL 190904, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 19, 2021) (citing Bostock,
the district court rejected the defendant’s argument that in an ADEA case, “‘an employee cannot claim
that age is a motive for the employer’s adverse conduct and simultaneously claim that there was any
other proscribed motive involved’.” The court held that proving “but for” causation under the ADEA
does not require proving that age was “the sole cause of the [adverse] employment action”); Starkey
v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1195, 1201–05 (S.D. Ind. 2020)
(defendant arguing that Title VII’s religious exemption provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a), allowed it
to decline to renew the employment contract of a gay woman who was married to a woman. The
defendant asserted that the plaintiff’s marriage violated her employment contract and contravened the
teaching of the Catholic Church. The district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim, finding that under Bostock, discrimination against person for
being gay is sex discrimination, and so long as sex is a decisive reason for taking an adverse
employment action against an employee, the employer violates Title VII, even if other factors, such a
religion, played a role in the decision.).
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VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), and 42
U.S.C. § 1981. Part II discusses how Bostock departed from the Court’s
previous pronouncements on what “but for” causation means and how that
departure resulted in a new mixed motive theory that makes it easier for a
plaintiff whose employer acted with a mixed motive to prove “but for”
causation and receive the full panoply of Title VII remedies.
I. WHAT IT MEANS UNDER TITLE VII TO DISCRIMINATE “BECAUSE OF”
RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN
What does it mean under Title VII24 to discriminate against an
employee “because of” race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?25
What does it mean to make an adverse employment decision “motivated
by” an impermissible reason?26 And how does one prove that “but for” an
impermissible reason, an employer would not have made an adverse
employment decision? In order gain a fuller understanding of the meaning
and application of Title VII’s “because of” and “motivating factor”
theories, as well as how one proves “but for” causation under Title VII,
one should start with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a case the Supreme
Court of the United States decided on May 1, 1989.27
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins Establishes the Mixed Motive Theory
Under Title VII and an Employer Affirmative Defense.
Ann Hopkins served as a senior manager for Price Waterhouse, a
national professional accounting partnership. In 1982, partners in the
Washington D.C. office where she worked proposed her as a candidate for
the partnership.28 At that time, 7 of Price Waterhouse’s 662 partners were
women, and of the eighty-eight candidates proposed for partnership that
year, Ms. Hopkins was the only woman.29
Thirty-two partners weighed in on Ms. Hopkins’s partnership
candidacy.30 Thirteen supported her candidacy, three recommended that it
be placed on hold, eight did not have an informed opinion about her, and
eight recommended that she not be admitted into the partnership.31
The partners described her as “an outstanding professional” with a
“deft touch,” and “strong character, independence, and integrity.”32 Her
24. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
27. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
28. Id. at 231–33.
29. Id. at 233.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 234.
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clients thought likewise.33 However, not every assessment of her was
positive.34 Prior to her partnership candidacy, the partners who evaluated
her work advised her to improve her relations with staff members, some
of whom found her abrasive and brusque.35
Nearly all of the negative comments the partners made about her in
connection with her partnership candidacy centered on how she interacted
with people, which some described as “overly aggressive, unduly harsh,
difficult to work with and impatient with staff.”36 Some partners, however,
couched their critiques of Ms. Hopkins in gendered terms.37 One described
her as “macho”; another intimated that she “overcompensated for being a
woman”; and another recommended that she enroll in “a course at a charm
school.”38
A number of partners criticized Ms. Hopkins’s use of profanity,
which prompted another partner to suggest that her use of profanity was
objectionable only “because it’s a lady using foul language.”39 A partner
who supported her partnership candidacy described her as someone who
“ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed
[manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady
[partner] candidate.”40
Forty-seven of the eighty-eight candidates proposed for partnership
the same year as Ms. Hopkins were admitted to the partnership, twentyone were rejected, and twenty, including Ms. Hopkins, were held over to
be reconsidered the next year.41 Thomas Beyer served as Ms. Hopkins’s
mentor at Price Waterhouse.42 He informed her that her chances for being
admitted to the partnership would improve if she would “walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”43
Although her partnership candidacy had been put on hold for a year,
before that year lapsed, two of the partners who supported Ms. Hopkins’s
candidacy withdrew their support, and Price Waterhouse informed her that
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 234–35. The thirteen partners who supported her partnership candidacy also made
negative comments about how she interacted with people. Id.
37. Id. at 235.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 235.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 233.
42. Emily Bazelon, Ann Hopkins: The Accountant Who Struck a Blow Against Gender
Stereotyping, N.Y. TIMES MAG., https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/27/magazine/livesthey-lived-ann-hopkins.html [https://perma.cc/9Z2B-9DFD].
43. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
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it would not reconsider her candidacy.44 After hearing this, Ms. Hopkins
resigned and sued Price Waterhouse in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.45
After a five day trial,46 the district court found Price Waterhouse’s
consideration of Ms. Hopkins’s interpersonal skills in its partnership
decisions were legitimate and genuine.47 It also found some of the
partners’ comments about her reflected “an impermissibly cabined view
of the proper behavior of women . . . Price Waterhouse . . . [did] nothing
to disavow reliance on such comments,”48 and Price Waterhouse
“consciously [gave] credence and effect to partners’ comments that
resulted from sex stereotyping.”49
The court held Price Waterhouse could avoid liability for equitable
relief, but not legal relief, if it could prove by clear and convincing
evidence that it would have made the same decision to put Ms. Hopkins’s
partnership candidacy on hold even if sex discrimination had played no
role its decision making process.50 Price Waterhouse did not make this
showing; therefore, the court found it liable for discriminating on the basis
of sex against Ms. Hopkins by permitting stereotypical views about
women to play a role in its decision not to admit her into the partnership.51
The court determined that Ms. Hopkins was entitled to back pay from
the date she should have been admitted to the partnership until the date she
resigned but found that she failed to present evidence as to the amount of
compensation she was due. Therefore, she could not recover any damages
except attorneys’ fees.52 The court also found that she failed to establish
that she had been constructively discharged following Price Waterhouse’s
announcement that it would not reconsider her partnership candidacy.
Therefore, the court did not award her back pay for the time period
following her resignation, nor did it order Price Waterhouse to admit her
into the partnership.53 Ms. Hopkins and Price Waterhouse both appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.54
44. Id. at 233 n.1.
45. Id. at 231–32, 233 n.1; Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 (D.D.C. 1985).
46. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
47. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1113–14.
48. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236–37.
49. Id. at 237.
50. Id.; Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1120–21.
51. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237; Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 463–64; Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at
1120.
52. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 463–64.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 465.
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The circuit court agreed with the district court that Price Waterhouse
illegally discriminated against Ms. Hopkins on the basis of sex.55 The court
disagreed, however, with the district court’s finding that Price Waterhouse
did not constructively discharge her, and it disagreed with the district
court’s finding that she was not entitled to back pay. Therefore, it reversed
the district court on those issues and remanded the case with instructions
to award her full relief.56
The circuit court also disagreed with the district court’s finding that
Price Waterhouse could avoid liability for equitable relief, but not legal
relief, if it could prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
made the same decision to put Ms. Hopkins’s partnership candidacy on
hold even if sex discrimination had played no role its decision making
process.57 Instead, according to the circuit court, if an employer proves by
clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision
even if an impermissible consideration had played no role in the decision,
it is not liable at all.58
Under the circuit court’s approach, if a Title VII plaintiff proves that
an employer acted with a mixed motive in its employment decision, the
employer has a complete defense to the plaintiff’s claim if it proves by
clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision
even if the impermissible motive had played no role in the decision making
process.59 Under the district court’s approach, if a plaintiff proves that an
employer acted with mixed motive in its employment decision, if the
employer proves by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
made the same decision even if the impermissible motive had played no
role in the decision making process, the employer is liable for legal relief,
but not equitable relief.60
When the circuit court decided Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, other
United States circuit courts were divided on the question of whether an
employer is liable pursuant to Title VII under a mixed motive theory and
if the employer would have made the same decision had the impermissible
reason had played no role in the decision.61 The Supreme Court of the
55. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237; Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 465–68.
56. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 472–73.
57. Id. at 470–71.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985).
61. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits held
that if a plaintiff proves that an employer based an adverse employment decision on an impermissible
reason and a permissible reason, in order for that plaintiff to prevail, he or she has to prove that “but
for” the impermissible reason, the employer would not have made the adverse decision. Bellissimo v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985); Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759
F.2d 355, 365–66 (4th Cir. 1985); Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1161 (5th Cir. 1987);

2021]

Cause for Concern or Cause for Celebration?

473

United States granted Price Waterhouse’s petition for a writ of certiorari
to resolve the circuit split regarding the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
burden of proof in a Title VII case when the evidence shows that the
defendant made an adverse employment decision based on an
impermissible reason and a permissible reason, i.e., the employer acted
with a mixed motive.62
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”63 The law
also makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way [that] would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”64
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court endeavored to
resolve the precise meaning of what it means to discriminate against a
person “because of” that person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.65 First, the Court held it is erroneous to interpret the phrase
“because of” to require proof of “but for causation” in cases where a Title
VII plaintiff proves that an employer acted with a mixed motive.66 The
McQuillen v. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664–65 (7th Cir. 1987). The United States
Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits held that if a plaintiff proves that
an employer based an adverse employment decision on an impermissible reason and a permissible
reason and proves that the impermissible reason played a substantial or motivating role in the decision,
the plaintiff prevails unless the employer proves it would have made the same decision even if the
impermissible reason had not played a role in the decision. Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 936–
37 (1st Cir. 1987); Berl v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 714–15 (2d Cir. 1988); Terbovitz v.
Fiscal Ct. of Adair Cnty., 825 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir. 1987); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715
F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983). In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit followed the same rule, except it required the employer to prove
it would have made the same decision by clear and convincing evidence in order to avoid liability.
Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 470–71. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that if a
plaintiff proves that an impermissible reason played a part in an adverse employment decision, the
plaintiff prevails; however, the employer can avoid a reinstatement order and liability for back pay if
it proves by clear and convincing evidence it would have made the same decision had the
impermissible reason not played a role in the decision. Fadhl v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 741 F.2d 1163,
1165–66 (9th Cir. 1984). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed the same
rule, except it required the employer to prove it would have made the same decision by a
preponderance of the evidence. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320–24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
62. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
65. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239–58.
66. Id. at 240–42. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976),
the Court held that when a Title VII plaintiff attempts to demonstrate an employer’s reason for an

474

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:463

Court held that in determining whether a particular factor is a “but for”
cause of an event, one begins by assuming that that particular factor
existed at the time of the event, and then one asks whether that event would
have occurred in the same way it did if that particular factor did not exist.67
According to the Court, in a Title VII mixed motive case, the critical
inquiry is whether an impermissible motive played a role in an adverse
employment decision at the moment the employer made the decision.68
Additionally, the Court pointed out that during the congressional debates
surrounding the enactment of Title VII, the United States House of
Representatives and the United States Senate both rejected a proposed
amendment that would have placed the word “solely” before the phrase
“because of.”69 The way the Court saw it, if at the time employer makes
an adverse employment decision, it does so based on an impermissible
reason and a permissible reason, that decision is “because of” both the
impermissible reason and the permissible reason, even if it later turns out
that the employer would have made the same decision had the
impermissible reason played no role in the decision.70
The Court did not think Congress’s use of the phrase “because of”
meant that a Title VII plaintiff is required to identify the precise causal
role impermissible factors and permissible factors played in an employer’s

adverse employment decision is pretextual, the plaintiff is required to do no more than show that an
impermissible reason was a but for cause of the decision. Price Waterhouse distinguished McDonald
by saying that the statement in McDonald that “no more is required to be shown than that race was a
‘but for’ cause” does not mean a plaintiff must prove but for causation; rather, the statement means
that if a plaintiff does prove but for causation, the plaintiff prevails. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
240 n.6. Price Waterhouse further distinguished McDonald by saying McDonald involved an
employer making an adverse employment decision solely because of race, which made that case a
single motive case rather than a mixed motive case like Price Waterhouse. Id.
67. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–41.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 241 n.7. Representative John Vernard Dowdy of Texas offered the amendment in the
United States House of Representatives. 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964). The House rejected the
amendment on February 10, 1964. Senator John Little McClellan of Arkansas offered the amendment
in the United States Senate. 110 CONG. REC. 13837 (1964). The Senate rejected the amendment on
June 15, 1964. 110 CONG. REC. 13837–38 (1964). Senator Clifford Philip Case, Jr., of New Jersey
said changing the language from “because of” to “solely because of” would “render [T]itle VII totally
nugatory.” 110 Cong. Rec. 13837 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clifford Philip Case, Jr.). He said, “If
anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal from
any I know of.” Id. He further explained that “this amendment would place upon persons attempting
to prove a violation of this section, no matter how clear the violation was, an obstacle so great as to
make the title completely worthless.” Id. Senator Warren Grant Magnuson of Washington echoed
those concerns. Id. He stated that “a legal interpretation or a court interpretation of the word ‘solely’
would so limit this section as probably to negate the entire purpose of what we are trying to do.” Id.
Ultimately, the Senate rejected Senator McClellan’s amendment by a vote of thirty-nine in favor, fifty
against, and eleven not voting. 110 CONG. REC. 13838 (1964).
70. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
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adverse employment decision.71 Instead, the Court found Congress
required a Title VII plaintiff to prove that an employer relied on an
impermissible factor in the decision, period.72 On the other hand, the Court
held reliance on an impermissible factor does not end the inquiry.73 The
Court held if a plaintiff does prove that the employer relied on an
impermissible factor in making an adverse employment decision, the
employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have made the same decision had the impermissible factor played no role
in the decision; otherwise, it faces Title VII liability.74 The Court described
this as an affirmative defense that is available to an employer if a plaintiff
carries his or her burden of persuasion on the question of whether an
impermissible factor played a role in the employer’s adverse employment
decision.75 If the plaintiff carries his or her burden of persuasion on this
question and the employer does not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the
impermissible factor, the Court held a factfinder is entitled to conclude
that the impermissible factor made a difference in the decision.76
The Court further held that if an employer makes an adverse
employment decision based on a mixed motive, i.e., a decision based on
an impermissible reason and a permissible reason, it does not make “sense
to ask whether the legitimate reason was the true reason for the decision.”77
On the other hand, the Court found if a Title VII plaintiff does not prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that an employer relied on an
impermissible reason in making an adverse employment decision, he or
she can only prevail by proving the employer’s articulated reason for the
decision is pretextual.78
71. Id.
72. Id. at 241–42.
73. See id. at 242.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 246.
76. Id. at 246 n.11.
77. Id. at 247.
78. Id. at 247 n.12. One can read this part of the Court’s opinion as establishing two kinds of
Title VII cases: pretext cases and mixed motive cases. Id. In the first step of a pretext case, the plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Texas Dep’t
of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981). For example, the plaintiff must prove she
applied for an available position, she was qualified for that position, and the employer rejected her
application under circumstances that raise an inference of illegal discrimination. Id. at 253 n.6. The
prima facie case raises an inference of illegal discrimination because one presumes the rejection of the
plaintiff’s application is more likely than not based on impermissible factors. Id. at 254 (quoting
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). This presumption, however, can be
rebutted. Id. 254 n.7. The employer can rebut this presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Id. at 254. This is a burden of production, not a burden of
persuasion. Id. at 254–56. If the defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff is then required to prove
that the reasons offered by the employer are pretextual. Id. at 256. The plaintiff can prove pretext by
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To support its ruling, the Court reasoned it did not “traverse new
ground.”79 In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle, the Court held once a plaintiff proves that an impermissible factor
was a substantial factor or a motivating factor in an employer’s adverse
employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision
had the impermissible factor not been a substantial factor or a motivating
factor in the decision.80
The Court in Price Waterhouse read Mt. Healthy to mean that a
plaintiff who proves that an impermissible reason was a substantial factor
or a motivating factor in an employer’s adverse employment decision
likewise proves that the impermissible reason was a “but for” cause of the
decision if the employer does not prove that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of the impermissible reason.81 When the Price
Waterhouse Court held that an impermissible factor was a motivating
factor in an employer’s adverse employment decision, the Court meant
that if one asked the employer at the time it made the decision what its
reasons were for making the decision and it answered truthfully, it would
say one of those reasons was an impermissible one.82 And in Ms.
Hopkins’s case, if Price Waterhouse acted on the belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive or she must not be aggressive, it acted on the basis
of a sex stereotype, which means it acted because of sex.83
The Court held an employer can assert this affirmative defense by
producing some objective evidence that it would have made the same
employment decision had the impermissible motive played no role in that
decision.84 However, the employer cannot prevail in a mixed motive case
direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 804-805 (1973)). Price Waterhouse is, of course, a mixed motive case. 490 U.S. at 239–58.
79. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248.
80. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
81. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249 (first citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228
(1985); then citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979); and then citing
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270–71, 271 n.21 (1977)). The
Court also cited NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp. for the proposition that once an employer
proves his or her employer made an adverse employment decision partly for an impermissible reason,
the burden shifted to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
made the same decision in the absence of the impermissible reason. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
250–51 (citing NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983)).
82. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
83. Id. The Court went on to say that “we are beyond the day when an employer [can] evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they [match] the stereotype associated with their group.” Id.
at 251. When Congress enacted Title VII, it intended to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles, Dep’t
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
84. Id. at 252.
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simply by asserting that a permissible reason informed its decision if, at
the time it made the decision, the permissible reason did not actually
motivate it to make the decision.85 Likewise, the employer cannot prevail
by only offering proof that when it made the adverse employment
decision, it did so in part for a permissible reason.86 Instead, the employer
must prove that the permissible reason by itself would have led to the same
decision.87
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse reversed the district and
circuit courts’ rulings that an employer has to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision in the
absence of the impermissible reason.88 It did so because Title VII cases are
civil cases subject to the same rules of civil litigation that apply in other
civil cases, and those rules include proof by a preponderance of the
evidence rather than proof by clear and convincing evidence.89 At bottom,
the Price Waterhouse Court held that when a Title VII plaintiff proves his
or her employer made an adverse employment decision motivated partly
by an impermissible reason and partly by a permissible reason, the
employer is liable unless it proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have made the same decision had the impermissible reason not
played a role at all.90
However, the decision was not unanimous.91 Justice William
Brennan wrote a four-Justice plurality opinion joined by Justices
Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens.92 Justice
Byron White wrote a concurrence only for himself,93 as did Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor.94 Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissent joined by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia.95
The way Justice White saw the case, Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle96 outlined the proper approach to causation
in a mixed motive employment discrimination case. 97 Mt. Healthy rejected
a requirement that the plaintiff in a mixed motive case prove an
impermissible factor was the sole reason the employer made an adverse
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 252–53.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 258.
91. Id. at 231, 258, 261, 279.
92. See generally id. at 231–58 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion).
93. See generally id. at 258–61 (White, J., concurring).
94. See generally id. at 261–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
95. See generally id. at 279–95 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
97. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258–59 (White, J., concurring).
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employment decision.98 Instead, the employee has to show that an
impermissible factor was a motivating factor in the decision; if he or she
makes that showing, the employer must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision had the impermissible
factor played no role at all.99 As far as Justice White was concerned,
because Mt. Healthy answered how a plaintiff has to prove causation in a
mixed motive case, it was not necessary to get into a discussion of whether
what Mt. Healthy held should be described as “but-for” causation or an
affirmative defense.100
The district court found in Ms. Hopkins’s case that Price Waterhouse
made an adverse employment decision partly for permissible reasons and
partly for impermissible reasons, which is the same finding the district
court made in Mt. Healthy.101 And just like the Court held in Mt. Healthy
with respect to the plaintiff’s burden of proof, the Price Waterhouse Court
held that Ms. Hopkins did not have to prove that the impermissible reasons
were “the only, principal, or true reason[s] for [Price Waterhouse’s]
[decision.]”102 Instead, Ms. Hopkins had to show that an impermissible
reason was a substantial factor in Price Waterhouse’s decision to not admit
her into the partnership.103
Justice White agreed with the plurality that Ms. Hopkins proved
Price Waterhouse made the decision to not admit her into the partnership
partly for impermissible reasons. He also agreed with the plurality that by
having proved that, the burden of persuasion shifted to Price Waterhouse
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that had the impermissible
reasons not played any role in its decision, it still would not have admitted
Ms. Hopkins into the partnership.104 He agreed with the plurality that its
approach to causation in Price Waterhouse did not depart from or modify
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine105 or McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.106
Burdine and McDonnell Douglas are pretext cases, and in such cases,
the focus is on whether the impermissible reason or the permissible reason,
but not both, is the true reason the employer made an adverse employment

98. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
99. Id. at 287.
100. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 259–60.
105. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
106. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
260 (White, J., concurring).
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decision.107 However, in mixed motive cases, an employer makes an
adverse employment decision partly for an impermissible reason and
partly for a permissible reason, and the focus is on whether the
impermissible reason was a substantial factor or a motivating factor in the
decision.108
Justice White agreed with the plurality that the employer has to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision had the impermissible reason played no role. However, he read
the plurality to require in most cases the employer adduce objective
evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the
impermissible reason; on this point, he disagreed with the plurality.109 In
his view, in a mixed motive case, if a permissible reason provided ample
grounds for the employer’s adverse employment decision, and the
employer testifies credibly that it would have made the same decision
based solely on that permissible reason, that would satisfy the employer’s
burden of proof.110
Curiously, Justice White suggested that if the employer denies the
allegation that it acted with an impermissible motive, but the factfinder
finds that it acted with an impermissible motive and a permissible motive,
the employer would not be liable under Title VII.111 Justice Brennan found
this suggestion “baffling.”112 Except for this “baffling” suggestion by
Justice White, it is hard to detect any other difference in how Justice White
would have decided this case from how the plurality decided the case.113
Justice O’Connor agreed with the plurality that because Ms. Hopkins
proved that Price Waterhouse declined to admit her into the partnership
partly because of sex stereotyping, a burden of persuasion shifted to Price
Waterhouse to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would still
have declined to admit Ms. Hopkins into the partnership had sex
stereotyping played no role at all in its decision.114 She further agreed with
107. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring) (quoting NLRB v. Transp.
Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1983)).
108. Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 n.2 (1977) (emphases added) (“[T]he burden was properly placed upon [the employee]
to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial factor’
or to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in the [employer’s] decision not to rehire
him . . . [H]aving carried that burden, . . . the [d]istrict [c]ourt should have gone on to determine
whether the [employer] had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision as to [the employee’s] reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.” ).
109. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 252 n.14 (plurality opinion).
113. Compare id. at 239–42, 244–53, 258 (plurality opinion), with id. at 258–61 (White, J.,
concurring).
114. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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the plurality that if an employer carries this burden, that is a complete
defense to Title VII liability.115 However, she disagreed with the plurality
regarding how a Title VII plaintiff is required to prove causation, and she
disagreed with the plurality and Justice White’s characterization that the
causation framework the Court announced was not a departure from Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine116 or McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.117 She viewed that departure, however, as justified in
mixed motive cases.118
On the issue of proof of causation, in her view, Title VII’s plain
language suggests that the plaintiff must prove an impermissible reason is
the “but-for” cause of an employer’s adverse employment decision.119 She
did not think a Title VII plaintiff should be required to prove that any
single factor played a definitive role in an employer’s adverse employment
decision, particularly in professional settings where decisions get made by
collegial bodies employing largely subjective criteria.120 To do so, she
said, “may be tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such
decisions.”121
She said the plurality read the causation requirement out of Title VII
and replaced it with an affirmative defense when it said that once a plaintiff
proves that an employer made an adverse employment decision partly
based on an impermissible reason, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
employer to prove that it would have made the same decision even if the
impermissible reason had played no role in the decision.122 In her view,
the burden of persuasion should not shift to the defendant unless the
plaintiff proves by direct evidence that an impermissible reason was a
substantial factor in the employer’s adverse employment decision, and if
the plaintiff makes such a showing, a factfinder can presume the
impermissible reason made a difference in the outcome of the decision
unless the employer offers proof to the contrary.123 As for the employer’s
proof, Justice O’Connor said the employer has to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision
in the absence of the impermissible reason, and in doing so, it does not
have to isolate the sole cause of the decision; instead, it has to prove that
115. Id.
116. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–56 (1981).
117. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973); Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
118. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 262–63.
120. Id. at 273–74 (first citing Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935–37 (1st Cir. 1987); and
then citing Thompkins v. Morris Brown Coll., 752 F.2d 558, 563 (11th Cir. 1985)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 275–76.
123. Id. at 276–77.
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if one eliminates the impermissible reason from the equation, it had
sufficient business reasons to make the same decision.124 She went on to
say that if the employer does not carry its burden of proof, a factfinder can
rightly conclude that the employer made the adverse employment decision
because of an impermissible reason and is liable under Title VII.125
Justice O’Connor’s main point of disagreement with the plurality is
her requirement that a plaintiff show by direct evidence that the employer
relied in a substantial way on an impermissible reason when it made an
adverse employment decision before shifting the burden of persuasion to
the employer to prove it would have made the same decision had it not
relied on the impermissible reason 126 She then outlined her view of how
the presentation of evidence should proceed in a Title VII disparate
treatment case.127
In her view, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing, for example, that she is protected by Title
VII,128 that she was qualified for an employment opportunity, that the
employer rejected her, and that after doing so, the employer continued to
seek applicants with the same or similar qualifications.129 The plaintiff
should then produce direct evidence that the employer rejected her for an
impermissible reason.130 A burden of production then shifts to the
124. Id.
125. Id. at 277.
126. Id. at 277–78.
127. Id. at 278–79; Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2). The law prohibits intentional
discrimination, which is known as disparate treatment, as well disparate impact discrimination, which
describes employment practices that are not intentionally discriminatory, but nevertheless have a
disproportionately adverse effect on persons because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). Disparate treatment occurs when an employer
intentionally “treat[s] [a] person less favorably than others because of [the person’s] race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin].” Id. at 577 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977,
985–86 (1988)). A disparate treatment plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against him or her on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Id.
128. Justice O’Connor wrote that a person must “[show] membership in a protected group.”
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring). It would be more accurate to say that
a person asserting a claim under Title VII must base his or her claim on a category that Title VII
covers, i.e., race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2). The phrase
“membership in a protected group” perpetuates the false notion that Title VII only protects certain
groups of people. The law protects every person from employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, hence, every person is a “[member] [of] a protected group,” and
no persons are the “special favorite of the law.” The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 61 (1883) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (the Civil War Amendments and Civil Rights Acts of 1875 did not make Blacks the
special favorite of the laws, but instead sought to accomplish for Blacks what every state in the Union
had done for whites, i.e., to secure and protect their rights as free persons and citizens; nothing more).
129. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
130. Id. at 278.

482

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:463

employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision.131 After receiving all of the evidence, the court should then
decide whether the case should proceed as a McDonnell Douglas132 and
Burdine133 pretext case or a Price Waterhouse mixed motive case.134 If the
plaintiff does not prove that the employer acted with a mixed motive, the
case proceeds as a pretext case, with the plaintiff bearing the burden of
persuasion on the ultimate issue of whether the employer made the adverse
employment decision because of an impermissible reason.135
Justice O’Connor said her proposed framework should apply in all
Title VII disparate treatment cases where the plaintiff asserts that an
impermissible reason played a substantial role in the employer’s adverse
employment decision.136 She viewed her proposed framework as an
alteration of the allocation of the burden of proof the Court announced in
McDonnell Douglas, which put her at odds with the plurality and with
Justice White.137 However, she did agree with the plurality and with Justice
White that a Title VII plaintiff who proves that her employer made an
adverse employment decision based on a mixed motive theory shifts a
burden of persuasion to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision had the impermissible
reason played no role in the decision. If the employer carries this burden,
it faces no Title VII liability.138
Justice Kennedy wrote a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia.139 Justice Kennedy, like Justice O’Connor, took
exception to the plurality’s causation analysis.140 He did not think race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin must be the sole cause of an
employer’s adverse employment decision in order to establish a Title VII
violation. However, he considered this separate from the question of
whether considering race, color, religion, sex, or national origin must be a
cause of the decision.141 In his view, an impermissible reason is a cause of
131. Id.
132. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03.
133. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–56 (1981).
134. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 278–79.
136. Id. at 279.
137. Compare id. at 279 (the plurality altered “the analytical framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas”), with id. at 248–50 (plurality opinion) (“In deciding as we do today, we do not traverse new
ground.”), with id. at 260 (White, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Brennan that applying [the
plurality’s] approach to causation in Title VII cases is not a departure from, and does not require
modification of, the Court’s holdings in [Burdine] and [McDonnell Douglas].”).
138. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 258 (plurality opinion);
id. at 259–60 (White, J., concurring).
139. See generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 284–85.
141. Id.
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an adverse employment decision when, “either by itself or in combination
with other factors, it made a difference to the decision.”142 He further
stated that an impermissible reason does not have to be the sole reason for
the decision in order to trigger Title VII liability, but it has to be a
necessary part of the decision. 143
Price Waterhouse was a 4–1–1–3 decision.144 The plurality, Justice
White, and Justice O’Connor agreed that if a Title VII plaintiff proves that
her employer made an adverse employment decision partly for an
impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision even if the
impermissible reason had played no role in the decision.145 These same
Justices agreed that if the employer carries this burden, it faces no Title
VII liability.146
The agreeing Justices splintered, however, on the question of how
the plaintiff is required to prove that her employer made an adverse
employment decision partly for an impermissible reason and partly for a
permissible reason.147 The plurality said when a plaintiff proves an
impermissible reason played a motivating part in the employer’s adverse
employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to
prove it would have made the same decision in the absence of the
impermissible reason.148 Justice White said the burden of persuasion shifts
to the employer when the plaintiff proves that an impermissible reason was
a substantial factor in the employer’s adverse employment decision.149
Justice O’Connor also said the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer
when the plaintiff proves that an impermissible reason was a substantial
142. Id. at 284.
143. Id. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976)).
144. Id. at 231–58 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion); id. at 258–
61 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 279–95 (Kennedy, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259–60 (White, J. concurring); id. at 261, 279
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259–60 (White, J. concurring); id. at 261, 279
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 240–42 (plurality opinion); id at 259–60 (White, J. concurring); id at 261–66, 273–79
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 258.
149. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). Justice White cited Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), as support for his view that the plaintiff has
to prove an impermissible reason was a substantial factor in the employer’s decision. Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258–59 (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287). Mt. Healthy held, however,
that the phrases “motivating factor” and “substantial factor” are synonymous. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S.
at 287 (emphasis added) (“[T]he burden was properly placed upon [the employee] to show that his
conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ or to put it in
other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in the [employer’s] decision not to rehire him.”).
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factor in the employer’s adverse employment decision, but she would
require the plaintiff to prove this by direct evidence.150
Because Price Waterhouse was a 4–1–1–3 decision, and “[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”151 In the aftermath of Price
Waterhouse, the United States circuit courts divided on the question of
whether Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, which would have required a
Title VII plaintiff to prove by direct evidence that her employer made an
adverse employment decision partly for an impermissible reason and
partly for a permissible reason, was controlling.152
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
On November 21, 1991, Congress approved the Civil Rights Act of
1991 (1991 Act).153 One of the reasons Congress enacted the 1991 Act was
its view that a series of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
“weakened the scope and effectiveness of civil rights protections[,] and
legislation [was] necessary to provide additional protections against
unlawful discrimination in employment.”154
150. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
151. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion)). For a comprehensive analysis of
Marks and how to apply it see Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions
Precedential Restraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017).
152. The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
held that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was controlling, thus requiring the plaintiff to prove her
mixed motive theory by direct evidence. Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580
(1st Cir. 1999); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995); Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d
636, 640–41 (8th Cir. 2002); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs., 91 F.3d 1449, 1453–54 (11th Cir. 1996). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held otherwise, concluding that a plaintiff is not
required to prove her mixed motive theory by direct evidence. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d
838, 850, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, joined by
Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, where he opined that under Marks,
430 U.S. at 193, Justice White’s concurrence rather than Justice O’Connor’s was controlling because
Justice White agreed with the plurality that the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer when the
plaintiff proves that an impermissible reason was a substantial factor in the employer’s adverse
employment decision; thus, he provided a fifth vote for a single rationale explaining the result of the
case. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 187–90 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens pointed out that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence could not be controlling because she wrote
only for herself in Price Waterhouse, and neither the plurality nor Justice White agreed with her direct
evidence requirement, and consequently, the direct evidence requirement was not the narrowest
ground on which five Justices agreed. Id. at 187–90.
153. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-1100.
154. Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2(2), 2(3), 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Congress specifically cited
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 642–79 (1989), as an example of a decision that
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The 1991 Act codified the part of Price Waterhouse that garnered the
assent of the plurality, Justice White, and Justice O’Connor, i.e., a plaintiff
can establish a violation of Title VII by “demonstrat[ing] that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.”155
The 1991 Act also overruled the part of Price Waterhouse that
garnered the assent of these same Justices who held that an employer has
a complete affirmative defense in cases where a plaintiff proves the
employer acted with a mixed motive and the employer proves it would
have made the same decision in the absence of an impermissible motive.156
Instead of giving an employer a complete affirmative defense to
liability when it proves it would have made the same decision in the
absence of the impermissible reason, the 1991 Act imposes liability on the
employer, but limits the relief the plaintiff can receive.157 Under the 1991
Act, an employer that proves it would have made the same adverse
“weakened the scope and effectiveness of [f]ederal civil rights protections” Pub. L. No. 102-166
§§ 2(2), 2(3), 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab,
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 103, 104–05, 109–15, 127–32 (2009) (providing an empirical study of employment
discrimination cases litigated in federal court between 1979 and 2006, which led the authors to
conclude that “federal courts disfavor employment discrimination plaintiffs,” and would-be-plaintiffs
file fewer cases because of the “fear of judicial bias at the district court level and the appellate court
level.” The study showed that “[employment discrimination] cases [end] less favorably for plaintiffs
than other kinds of cases, [and] [p]laintiffs who appeal their losses or [have to defend their victories
on appeal] fare remarkably poorly in the circuit courts.” Between 1979 and 2006, employment
discrimination plaintiffs prevailed in 15% of cases, plaintiffs in other kind of cases prevailed in 51%
of cases, and “appellate courts reversed plaintiffs’ wins far more often than defendants’ wins.”)
155. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
Section 2000e-2(m) says:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.
See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 258–60
(White, J., concurring); id. at 276–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
156. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b)(3), 105 Stat. 1075-1076 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) says:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title
and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court – (i) may grant declaratory relief,
injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
See also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 258–60 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 276–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
157. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b)(3), 105 Stat. 1075-1076 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
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employment decision in the absence of the impermissible reason is liable
for declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and
costs that are “directly attributable only to the pursuit of [the] [mixed
motive] claim.”158 The employer is not, however, liable for damages, nor
can it be ordered to admit, reinstate, hire, promote, or pay the plaintiff.159
In sum, the 1991 Act codified the holding of Price Waterhouse that
a plaintiff can establish a violation of Title VII by “demonstrate[ing] that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.”160 The 1991 Act overruled the part of Price Waterhouse that
held if a plaintiff proves her employer made an adverse employment
decision based on a mixed motive, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
made the same decision had the impermissible reason played no role in the
decision, and if the employer carries this burden, the employer faces no
Title VII liability.161 The 1991 Act replaced this complete affirmative
defense and replaced it with limited form of liability that does not include
damages or an order to admit, reinstate, hire, promote, or pay the
plaintiff.162
C. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Supreme Court held that a Title
VII plaintiff who asserts her employer acted with a mixed motive is not
required to present direct evidence of that mixed motive in order to get a
mixed motive jury instruction.163 Desert Palace presented the Court with
the first opportunity to decide what effect the 1991 Act had on jury
instructions in mixed motive cases and whether Justice O’Connor’s Price
Waterhouse concurrence was controlling.164
Catharina Costa worked for Desert Palace as a warehouse worker and
heavy equipment operator.165 Desert Palace terminated Ms. Costa’s
employment after she got involved in a physical altercation with a

158. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i)).
159. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii)).
160. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m));
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 258–60 (White, J., concurring);
id. at 276–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
161. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b)(3), 105 Stat. 1075-1076 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 258–60
(White, J., concurring); id. at 276–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
162. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
163. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).
164. Id. at 98.
165. Id. at 95.
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coworker.166 Ms. Costa sued Desert Palace for sex discrimination in the
United States District Court for the District of Nevada.167 Over Desert
Palace’s objection, the district court gave the jury a mixed motive
instruction that said if it found that Ms. Costa’s sex was a motivating factor
in why Desert Palace treated her the way it did, it should find for Ms. Costa
even if it found that Desert Palace was also motivated by a lawful
reason.168
The jury returned a verdict for Ms. Costa, awarding her back pay,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages.169 Desert Palace appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which vacated
the district court decision and remanded the case, holding the district court
should not have given the jury a mixed motive instruction because Ms.
Costa failed to present direct evidence of sex discrimination.170 The Ninth
Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc.171
The en banc court reinstated the district court judgment, holding that
Title VII’s “motivating factor” section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), does not
require a plaintiff asserting a mixed motive Title VII claim to prove her
claim by direct evidence.172 The en banc court declined “to get mired in
the debate over whether Justice O’Connor’s [Price Waterhouse
concurrence] was controlling” because the 1991 Act resolved the question
of whether a Title VII plaintiff who asserts a mixed motive claim has to
prove her claim by direct evidence.173 According to the en banc court, the
1991 Act allows a plaintiff to prove her mixed motive claim by direct or
circumstantial evidence.174 In light of this conclusion, the en banc court
held that Ms. Costa did produce sufficient evidence to authorize a mixed
motive jury instruction.175 Desert Palace petitioned the Supreme Court to
hear the case, and the Court agreed to do so.176

166. Id. at 95–96.
167. Id. at 96.
168. Id. at 96–97 (citing Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc)).
169. Id.at 90, 97.
170. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 884–91 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 274
F.3d 1306, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 2001).
171. Costa, 299 F.3d at 844 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The opinion was 7-to-4, with Chief
Judge Mary Schroeder and Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Barry Silverman, Susan Graber, Margaret
McKeown, Raymond Fisher, and Richard Paez in the majority, and Judges Alex Kozinski, Ferdinand
Fernandez, Andrew Kleinfeld, and Ronald Gould dissenting. Costa, 299 F.3d at 844–65 (majority
opinion), 865–67 (dissenting opinion).
172. Id. at 853–54 (majority opinion).
173. Id. at 851.
174. Id. at 849, 855.
175. Id. at 858–59.
176. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 537 U.S. 1099, 1099 (2003).
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Desert Palace said that on its face, § 2000e-2(m) does not require a
Title VII plaintiff to “demonstrate” by direct evidence that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the adverse
employment decision.177 The 1991 Act created 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m),
which says “an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.”178 Additionally, the 1991 Act
defined “demonstrate” to mean “mee[t] the burdens of production and
persuasion”;179 in the Court’s view, if Congress intended the word
“demonstrate” to require a party to meet his or her burden of production
and burden of persuasion by direct evidence or some other heightened
evidentiary showing, it would have included language explicitly saying
that in § 2000e(m).180
Ultimately, the Court held that a Title VII plaintiff is entitled to a
mixed motive jury instruction if she presents sufficient evidence that a
reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence that her
employer’s adverse employment decision was motivated by an
impermissible reason, and she can prove this by circumstantial or direct
evidence.181 Because the Court decided the case based on the statutory text
of the 1991 Act alone, it did not address the question of whether Justice
O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence was controlling.182
The Court in Desert Palace was unanimous and included Justice
O’Connor, who recognized that the 1991 Act does not require a plaintiff
to prove a mixed motive theory solely by direct evidence183 She joined the
Court’s opinion, but she wrote a concurrence only for herself where she
said that prior to the enactment of the 1991 Act, the burden of persuasion
only shifted to the employer when a Title VII plaintiff asserting disparate
treatment based on the employer’s mixed motive demonstrated by direct
evidence that an impermissible factor played a substantial role in the
employer’s adverse employment decision.184 She conceded, however, that
177. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003).
178. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (1991).
179. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 104, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m));
Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)).
180. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99.
181. Id. at 101–02.
182. Id. at 98–02.
183. Id.
184. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 275 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). No other Justice joined Justice
O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence. She did, however, agree with the plurality and with
Justice White that if a Title VII plaintiff proves her employer made an adverse employment decision
partly for an impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason, the burden of persuasion shifts
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the 1991 Act codified a different rule for Title VII mixed motive cases,
and that rule does not require the plaintiff to prove her mixed motive
theory by direct evidence.185
At bottom, Desert Palace established the rule that a Title VII plaintiff
who asserts her employer acted with a mixed motive when it made an
adverse employment decision can prove her case with direct or
circumstantial evidence.186
D. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
Six years after Desert Palace, the Court decided Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., and held that the ADEA 187 does not recognize a
mixed motive theory.188 The question presented in Gross was whether a
plaintiff asserting a claim under the ADEA must present direct evidence
of age discrimination in order to obtain a mixed motive jury instruction.189
Although Gross is an ADEA case, the language of the ADEA was
“‘derived in haec verba from Title VII’,” and the Court has “long
recognized that [its] interpretations of Title VII’s language apply ‘with
equal force in the [ADEA]’.”190
In 2003, when Jack Gross was fifty-four years old, his employer,
FBL Financial Group, Inc. (FBL), reassigned him and transferred a
number of his job responsibilities to a person who used to be his
subordinate and who was in her early forties.191 Mr. Gross deemed this a
demotion, so he sued FBL in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa192 under the ADEA, which prohibits an
employer from making an adverse employment decision because of an
to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision
even if the impermissible reason had played no role in the decision, which provided six votes for this
conclusion. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259–60 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 261, 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring). These same Justices provided six votes for the
conclusion that if the employer carries this burden, it faces no Title VII liability. Id. at 258 (plurality
opinion); id at 259–60 (White, J. concurring); id. at 261, 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring). No other
Justice, however, agreed with Justice O’Connor’s conclusion that the burden of persuasion should
only shift to the employer when a Title VII plaintiff asserting disparate treatment based on the
employer’s mixed motive demonstrates by direct evidence that an impermissible factor played a
substantial role in the employer’s adverse employment decision. Id. at 261, 276–79 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
185. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 101–02 (majority opinion).
187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34.
188. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 169–70 (2009).
189. Id. at 169–70.
190. Id. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S.
111, 121 (1985)).
191. Id. at 170 (majority opinion).
192. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 356 (8th Cir. 2008).
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employee’s age.193 During his trial, Mr. Gross introduced evidence that
FBL reassigned him partly because of his age.194 FBL asserted it
reassigned Mr. Gross as part of a corporate restructuring and that his new
assignment better suited his skill set.195
Mr. Gross requested an instruction that allowed the jury to find FBL
liable if he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a
motivating factor in FBL’s decision to demote him.196 FBL objected to this
instruction, but the district court overruled its objection.197 The court
further instructed the jury that age constitutes a motivating factor if it
played a role in FBL’s decision to demote Mr. Gross.198 Finally, the court
instructed the jury to find in favor of FBL if it proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have demoted Mr. Gross even if age had
played no role in its decision.199 The jury returned a verdict for Mr. Gross
in the amount of $46,945.200
FBL appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit and argued that the district court erroneously instructed the jury,
and the Eighth Circuit agreed.201 In the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, Justice
O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence was controlling; therefore,
Mr. Gross had to present direct evidence that his age was a motivating
factor in FBL’s decision to demote him, and only if he presented such
evidence would the burden of persuasion shift to FBL to prove that it
would have made the same decision had it not considered his age at all.202
Based on this analysis, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court
erroneously instructed the jury because the instructions allowed the burden
of persuasion to shift to FBL based on circumstantial evidence rather than
direct evidence.203 Mr. Gross conceded that he did not present direct
evidence of age discrimination, and therefore, the Eighth Circuit held that
the district court should not have given the jury a mixed motive
instruction.204 The Eighth Circuit further held that because Mr. Gross did
not present direct evidence that age was a motivating factor in FBL’s
decision to demote him, the district court should have instructed the jury

193. Gross, 557 U.S. at 170 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. 170–71.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008).
202. Id. at 359.
203. Id. at 360.
204. Id.
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to return a verdict for him only if he “proved that age was the determining
factor in FBL’s employment action.”205
Mr. Gross then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the United States seeking an answer to the question of whether a
plaintiff who asserts a claim under the ADEA must present direct evidence
of age discrimination in order to obtain a mixed motive jury instruction.206
Before reaching this question, however, the Court said it had to decide if
the burden of persuasion ever shifts to the employer in a mixed motive
ADEA case.207 The Court began by recounting that the Price Waterhouse
plurality, Justice White, and Justice O’Connor agreed that when a Title
VII plaintiff proves that an impermissible reason was a motivating factor
or a substantial factor in her employer’s adverse employment decision, the
burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have made the same decision had the
impermissible reason played no role in the decision, and if the employer
carries this burden, it faces no liability.208
Next, the Court recounted that in Desert Palace v. Costa, the Court
recognized that the 1991 Act codified the plurality, Justice White, and
Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse agreement that when a Title VII
plaintiff proves that an impermissible reason was a motivating factor or a
substantial factor in her employer’s adverse employment decision, the
burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have made the same decision had the
impermissible reason played no role in the decision.209 Desert Palace also
recognized that the 1991 Act eliminated the complete affirmative defense
the plurality, Justice White, and Justice O’Connor established in Price
Waterhouse and replaced it with a limited affirmative defense that limits
an employer’s liability if it proves it would have made the same decision
had an impermissible reason played no role in its decision.210
Desert Palace, however, was a Title VII case, and in Gross, the Court
made a point of saying that it had never held that the burden shifting
framework that Price Waterhouse announced and that the 1991 Act

205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 173–74 (first citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality
opinion); then citing id at 258–60 (White, J., concurring); and then citing id. at 276–79 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
209. Id. at 174 (first citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94–95 (2003); then citing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); and then citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
210. Id. at 174 (first citing Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94–95; then citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m); and then citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2(B)).
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codified applied to ADEA cases.211 When Congress enacted the 1991 Act,
it amended Title VII to codify the mixed motive theory and to provide
employers with a limited affirmative defense. It also amended the ADEA,
but it did not add the mixed motive theory to the ADEA.212 The Gross
Court said it could not ignore the fact that the 1991 Act amended Title VII
to codify the mixed motive theory, but it did not do the same for the ADEA
even though the 1991 Act amended both Title VII and the ADEA.213
Moreover, Desert Palace and Price Waterhouse are Title VII cases, and
therefore, the Gross Court concluded that Title VII cases do not govern
the interpretation of the ADEA.214 Gross then turned to the text of the
ADEA to determine whether it authorizes a mixed motive claim.215
The relevant provision of the ADEA says, “[i]t shall be unlawful for
an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s age.”216 Gross interpreted this language to mean that an
employer violates the ADEA when age is the reason rather than a reason
it makes an adverse employment decision.217 This means that an ADEA
211. Id. Justice Stevens dissented in Gross, and one of the reasons he did was that in his view,
the Court should have interpreted the ADEA in the same way it interpreted Title VII because the
language of the ADEA was “‘derived in haec verba from Title VII’,” and the Court had “long
recognized that [its] interpretations of Title VII’s language apply ‘with equal force in the [ADEA]’.”
Id. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121
(1985)). Justice Thomas offered three responses to Justice Stevens’s argument on this point. Id. at 174
n.2 (majority opinion). First, “the Court’s approach to interpreting the ADEA in light of Title VII ha[d]
not been uniform” as evidenced by General Dynamics Land Systems., Inc. v. Cline, where the Court
declined to interpret the phrase “because of . . . age” in the ADEA to prohibit discrimination against
all ages notwithstanding the fact that the Court had previously interpreted the phrase “because
of . . . race [or] sex” in Title VII to prohibit discrimination against persons of all races and sexes. Id.
(citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584, 592 n.5 (2004)). Second, it remained
an open question whether the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973),
framework for Title VII pretext cases applied in ADEA cases. Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 n.2. Third, the
textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA demanded that the Court not apply Price
Waterhouse and Desert Palace to the ADEA. Id.
212. Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (first citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); then citing
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1079 (1991) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(e)); and then citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 302, 105 Stat. 1088
(1991)).
213. Id. 174–75 (2009) (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991)).
214. Id. at 175.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 176 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
217. Id. (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). The part of Biggins the
Court cited says, “Whatever the employer’s decision[-]making process, a disparate treatment claim
cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a
determinative influence on the outcome.” Biggins, 507 U.S. at 610 (emphases added). The Court also
cited dictionary definitions of “because of.” Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (first citing 1 Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 194 (1966) (because of means by reason of or on account of); then citing 1
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disparate treatment plaintiff “must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause
of” her employer’s adverse employment decision.218 Regardless of
whether an ADEA disparate treatment plaintiff asserts that her employer
acted with a mixed motive or a single motive, her burden of persuasion is
the same, i.e., she has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
age was “the ‘but-for’ cause” of her employer’s adverse employment
decision.219 She can, however, prove this by direct or circumstantial
evidence.220 And even if she does prove by direct or circumstantial
evidence that age was the but for cause of her employer’s adverse
employment decision, the burden of persuasion does not shift to the
employer to prove it would have made the same decision had age not
played a role in its decision because the 1991 Act did not add a mixed
motive provision to the ADEA like it did to Title VII.221
Ultimately, the Court held that a mixed motive instruction is “never
proper in an ADEA case” because the text of the ADEA, unlike the text of
Title VII, does not provide for a mixed motive theory, which means the
burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to prove that it would
have made the same decision had age not factored into its decision.222 The
Court’s holding did not answer the question of whether an ADEA plaintiff
has to “present direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence . . . that age was
the ‘but for’ cause of the . . . [adverse employment decision]” in order “to
obtain a burden-shifting instruction.”223 The Court did say, however, that
“[t]here is no heightened evidentiary requirement for ADEA plaintiffs to
satisfy their burden of persuasion that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of their
employer’s adverse action . . . and [the Court] [implies] none.”224

Oxford English Dictionary 746 (1933) (because of means by reason of or on account of); and then
citing The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 132 (1966) (because means by reason
or on account)).
218. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (first citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639,
652–55 (2008); then citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 n.14 (2007); and then
citing R. PAGE KEETON & WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th
ed. 1984)).
219. Id. at 177–78 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 141–43 (2000)).
220. Id. at 177–78 n.4.
221. Id. at 173–75, 177–78 n.4.
222. Id. at 170.
223. Id. at 178 n.4 (emphasis added).
224. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)). The Court did, however, imply that if a plaintiff does present
circumstantial evidence that her age was the but for cause of her employer’s adverse employment
decision, she can obtain a burden shifting instruction. Id. (“‘Congress has been unequivocal when
imposing heightened proof requirements’ in other statutory contexts, including in other subsections of
Title 29, when it has seen fit.” (quoting Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003)); see also id.
(first citing 25 U.S.C. § 2504(b)(2)(B) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence); and then
citing 29 U.S.C. § 722(a)(2)(A) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence)).
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Gross said five times that the plaintiff in an ADEA disparate
treatment case has to prove that age was the but for cause of her employer’s
adverse employment decision, and it said once that she has to prove that
age was the reason for that decision.225 One can read this to mean a plaintiff
in an ADEA case has to prove that age was the sole reason or the exclusive
reason her employer made an adverse employment decision.226
Gross was a 5–4 decision.227 Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the
majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. and
Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Samuel Alito, Jr.228
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent joined by Justices David Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer,229 and Justice Breyer wrote a
dissent joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg.230
The way Justice Stevens saw it, “[t]he most natural reading of
‘[because of]’” means employers are barred from making adverse
employment decisions “motivated in whole or in part by the age of the
employee.”231 He first addressed the majority’s conclusion that the
ADEA’s prohibition on employment discrimination “because of” a
person’s age requires a plaintiff to prove that her employer made an
adverse employment decision solely or exclusively because of her age.232
He based this conclusion on Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act.233 In
Price Waterhouse, the plurality and Justice White agreed that when an
employer makes an adverse employment with a mixed motive, that
employer made a decision “because of” an impermissible reason, which
differs from the type of “but for” causation the Gross majority required

225. Id. at 176 (the reason; the but for cause), 177 (the but for cause), 177 n.4 (the but for cause),
178 (the but for cause), 180 (the but for cause) (emphases added).
226. Id. The dissenting Justices in Gross thought the majority equated “because of” with “solely
because of” or “exclusively because of” and did not agree that proving an employer made an adverse
employment decision “because of” a person’s age means the plaintiff has to prove that the employer
acted “solely because of” or “exclusively because of” the plaintiff’s age. Id. at 183 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the dictionaries the majority cited do not define “because of” to mean
“solely by reason of” or “exclusively on account of,” and moreover, the Price Waterhouse plurality
rejected a reading of the “because of” language in Title VII to mean “solely because of” or “exclusively
because of,” and instead, read that language to mean an employer was “motivated by” an
impermissible reason when it made an adverse employment decision.).
227. Id. at 168–80 (Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy & Alito, JJ.); id. at 180–
90 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 190–92 (Breyer, J., joined
by Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
228. Id. at 168–80 (majority opinion)
229. Id. at 180–90 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
230. Id. at 190–92 (Breyer, J., joined by Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
231. Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. Id. (first citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989); and then citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
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ADEA cases.234 Additionally, the 1991 Act codified Price Waterhouse’s
interpretation of the “because of” language in Title VII when it defined an
unlawful employment practice to include an employer making an adverse
employment decision based on mixed motives.235
According to Justice Stevens, when Congress passed the 1991 Act,
it emphasized “that the motivating-factor test was consistent with its
original intent in enacting Title VII” because when Congress enacted Title
VII, it “intended to prohibit all invidious consideration of sex, race, color,
religion, or national origin in employment decisions,” which means “any
reliance on [an impermissible reason] in making employment decisions is
illegal.”236
Thus, in Justice Stevens’s view, the “because of” language in the
ADEA means the same thing the “because of” language means in Title
VII.237 Justice Stevens also would have answered the question on which
the Court granted certiorari, and that is whether an ADEA plaintiff is
required to present direct evidence of age discrimination in order to obtain
a mixed motive jury instruction.238 He would have answered “no” to that
question because in his view, Desert Palace v. Costa settled the direct
evidence debate when the Court held that a plaintiff is not limited to direct
evidence only in meeting her burden of proof in a mixed motive Title VII
case.239
The direct evidence versus circumstantial evidence debate stemmed
from Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence where she, and
she alone, said a Title VII disparate treatment plaintiff asserting a mixed
motive theory has to prove her theory by direct evidence only.240 Because
Price Waterhouse was decided by a “fragmented Court,” the holding of
the case is the “position taken by those [Justices] who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds.”241 Justice Stevens wrote that Justice
White’s concurrence rather than Justice O’Connor’s was controlling
because Justice White agreed with the plurality that the burden of
persuasion shifts to the employer when the plaintiff proves that an
impermissible reason was a substantial factor in the employer’s adverse

234. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality opinion); id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
235. Gross, 537 U.S. at 185 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
236. Id. at 187 (first quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 2, 17 (1991); then quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 45 (1991); and then quoting S. Rep. No. 101-315, at 6, 22 (1990)) (emphases
added).
237. Id. at 183–85.
238. Id. at 187–88.
239. Id. at 187–88 (citing Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003)).
240. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276–77 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
241. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion)).
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employment decision, and thus, he provided a fifth vote for a single
rationale explaining the result of the case.242
He also pointed out that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence could not
be controlling because she wrote only for herself in Price Waterhouse, and
neither the plurality nor Justice White agreed with her direct evidence
requirement; consequently, the direct evidence requirement was not the
narrowest ground on which five Justices agreed.243 According to Justice
Stevens, any questions remaining after Price Waterhouse regarding direct
evidence versus circumstantial evidence were put to rest in Desert Palace
when the Court held that a plaintiff is not limited to direct evidence only
in meeting her burden of proof in a mixed motive Title VII case.244
Ultimately, Gross held that there is no mixed motive theory available
under the ADEA, which means a plaintiff cannot pursue an age
discrimination claim under the ADEA if her employer made an adverse
employment decision partly for age-related reasons and partly for non-agerelated reasons.245 And if she proves her employer acted for age an age
related reason, she has to prove that age was the reason for the adverse
decision, not just a reason.246
E. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar
Four years after deciding Gross and twenty-four years after deciding
Price Waterhouse, the Court decided University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar and held that Title VII’s mixed motive theory
does not apply to retaliation claims.247 Nassar involved the interplay
between two sections of Title VII: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a),248 which
prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

242. Gross, 557 U.S. at 187–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 187–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101–02).
245. Id. at 169–70, 173–75, 178, 180 (majority opinion).
246. Id. at 176–78, 180 (emphases added).
247. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
248. Section 2000e-2(a) provides in full:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which (sic) would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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3(a),249 which prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee
because the employee opposed, complained about, or sought remedies for
discrimination prohibited by § 2000e-2(a).250 Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits
what the Court describes as “status” discrimination, while § 2000e-3(a)
prohibits what the Court describes as “retaliation” discrimination.251
In the aftermath the 1991 Act, a Title VII plaintiff who asserts a
§ 2000e-2(a) status claim can proceed under two theories: one, that her
employer made an adverse employment decision “because of” race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin;252 or two, that her employer made an
adverse employment decision “motivated by” race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.253 When a Title VII plaintiff proceeds under the “because
of” theory, she has to prove that the causal link between her employer’s
adverse employment decision and her injury is so close that her injury
would not have occurred “but for” her employer’s discriminatory
motive.254 The Court describes this as “but for causation,” and the
implication from Gross is proving “but for causation” requires proving
that the employer acted “solely because of” an impermissible reason.255
When a Title VII plaintiff proceeds under the “motivating factor”
theory, she does not need to prove that her injury would not have occurred
“but for” her employer’s discriminatory motive; rather, she only needs to
prove that her employer’s adverse employment decision was “motivated
by” a discriminatory motive.256 The Court describes this as a “lessened
causation standard,” which means a Title VII plaintiff can obtain some
249. Section 2000e-3(a) provides in full:
(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement
proceedings
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labormanagement committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including
on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor
organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership,
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
250. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 342.
251. Id.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
253. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
254. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343.
255. Id.; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–78, 180 (2009). Gross said five times
that the plaintiff in an ADEA disparate treatment case has to prove that age was the but for cause of
her employer’s adverse employment decision, and it said once that she has to prove that age was the
reason for that decision. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (the reason; the but for cause), 177 (the but for cause),
177 n.4 (the but for cause), 178 (the but for cause), 180 (the but for cause) (emphases added).
256. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343 (first citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989);
and then citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
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relief, albeit limited,257 if she proves that her employer acted partly for an
impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason, and her
employer proves that it would have made the same decision had the
impermissible reason played no role at all.258
In Nassar, the Court held that this “lessened causation standard” does
not apply to a § 2000e-3(a) retaliation claim.259 In 1995, Dr. Naiel Nassar,
a medical doctor, went to work for the University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center, which is an academic institution within the University of
Texas system.260 He served as a member of the university’s faculty and as
a staff physician at the medical center until 1998, when he left to obtain
additional medical education.261 In 2001, Dr. Nassar returned to work as a
member of the faculty and as a staff physician.262 Dr. Nassar, who is
Middle Eastern, complained that his supervisor, Dr. Beth Levine,
discriminated against him on the basis of his religion and national origin
as evidenced in part by a comment she made that “Middle Easterners are
lazy.”263
In 2006, Dr. Nassar resigned his faculty position and sent a letter to
Dr. Gregory Fitz, the university’s Chair of Internal Medicine who also
served as Dr. Levine’s supervisor, stating that he resigned because of Dr.
Levine’s harassment, which he claimed, “‘stem[med] from . . . religious,
racial[,] and cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims.’”264 Dr. Levine
reacted negatively to Dr. Nassar’s written accusations against Dr. Levine;
in fact, he thought those accusations “publicly humiliated” her, and he felt
that it was “very important that she be publicly exonerated.”265
In the midst of this, the medical center offered Dr. Nassar a position
as a staff physician, but when Dr. Fitz learned of this offer, he objected on
the ground that all staff physicians had to be members of the university’s
faculty in accordance with an agreement between the medical center and
the university.266 The medical center then revoked its offer to Dr. Nassar,
and he filed a Title VII case against the medical center in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas asserting that Dr. Levine
257. A prevailing plaintiff in a mixed-motive case can obtain declaratory relief, certain
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs that are “directly attributable only to the pursuit of [the]
[mixed motive] claim”; however, her employer is not liable for damages, nor can it be ordered to
admit, reinstate, hire, promote, or pay the plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
258. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 343–44.
261. Id. at 344.
262. Id.
263. Id. (quoting Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2012)).
264. Id. (quoting Nassar, 674 F.3d at 451).
265. Id. at 344–45.
266. Id. at 343–45.
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engaged in racial and religious harassment in violation of § 2000e-2(a) that
resulted in his being constructively discharged from his faculty position,
and that Dr. Fitz engaged in retaliation discrimination against him in
violation of § 2000e-3(a) when he encouraged the medical center to revoke
its offer of employment because he complained about Dr. Levine.267
A jury returned a verdict for Dr. Nassar on both his § 2000e-2(a)
status claim and his § 2000e-3(a) retaliation claim and awarded him
$438,167.66 in back pay and benefits and $3,187,500 in compensatory
damages.268 Dr. Nassar and the medical center each appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.269 The Fifth Circuit vacated
Dr. Nassar’s constructive discharge award, finding that he did not present
sufficient evidence to support it.270 The court affirmed his retaliation
award, finding that Dr. Nassar presented sufficient evidence that Dr. Fitz
was partly motivated by retaliation when he encouraged the medical center
to revoke its offer of employment.271 The court also found that a Title VII
plaintiff asserting a § 2000e-3(a) retaliation claim only has to prove that
retaliation was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment
decision.272
The medical center filed a petition for rehearing and a petition for
rehearing en banc.273 The Fifth Circuit denied both petitions, with nine
judges voting against rehearing the case en banc and six judges voting in
favor of rehearing the case en banc.274 Four of the six judges who voted to
rehear the case en banc joined a dissent that reasoned that the motivating
factor theory does not apply to § 2000e-3(a) retaliation claims. Instead,
Title VII plaintiffs asserting § 2000e-3(a) retaliation claims must prove
that retaliation was the sole reason for an adverse employment decision.275
267. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., No. 3:08–CV–1337–B, 2010 WL 3000877, at *1
(N.D. Tex. July 27, 2010), vacated and remanded by Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 537 F.
App’x 525, 525 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
268. Id. at *1. The district court reduced the compensatory damage award to $300,000 in
accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D), which caps compensatory damages for future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses at $300,000 if the employer has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.
269. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2012), vacated and
remanded by Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362–63.
270. Nassar, 674 F.3d at 453.
271. Id. at 454.
272. Id.
273. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 688 F.3d 211, 211 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
274. Id. Judges Eugene Davis, Carl Stewart, James Dennis, Edward Prado, Jennifer Elrod, Leslie
Southwick, Catharina Haynes, James Graves, Jr., and Stephen Higginson voted against rehearing the
case en banc. Id. Chief Judge Edith Jones and Judges E. Grady Jolly, Jerry Smith, Emilio Garza, Edith
Clement, and Priscilla Owen voted in favor of rehearing the case en banc. Id.
275. Id. at 211, 212–14 (Smith, J. joined by Jones, C.J., Jolly & Clement, JJ., dissenting).

500

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:463

The Supreme Court granted the medical center’s petition for certiorari to
decide whether a Title VII plaintiff who asserts a § 2000e-3(a) retaliation
claim has to prove that her employer made an adverse employment
decision solely because of retaliation.276
The Court recapitulated its efforts to define what it means to
discriminate against a person “because of” a prohibited reason, which
meant starting with Price Waterhouse and the six Justices who agreed that
a Title VII plaintiff could prevail on a § 2000e-2(a) status claim if she
proves that her employer made an adverse employment decision with a
mixed motive.277 The Court then turned to the 1991 Act, which codified
part of Price Waterhouse at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), which says, “an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.”278 Nassar described § 2000e-2(m) as a
“lessened causation standard” for § 2000e-2(a) status discrimination.279
Next, the Court turned to Gross, which held that the ADEA’s
language prohibiting discrimination “because of” a person’s age means
that an ADEA plaintiff has to prove that age was the reason her employer
discriminated against her, which the Court described as proof of “but for”
causation.280 Gross rejected applying a § 2000e-2(m) “lessened causation
standard” to ADEA claims because the 1991 Act amended both Title VII
and the ADEA, but the 1991 Act did not add a provision like § 2000e-2(m)
to the ADEA.281 And finally, despite the fact that the “because of”
language in Title VII is the same as the “because of” in the ADEA, Gross
did not rely on Title VII cases in interpreting the ADEA because the 1991
Act’s codification of part of Price Waterhouse and its overruling of part
of that same case, “. . . indicated that the motivating factor standard was
not an organic part of Title VII and thus could not be read into the
ADEA.”282
276. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346 (2013).
277. Id. at 348 (first citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality
opinion); then citing id. at 259 (White, J. concurring); and then citing id. at 276 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
278. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (1991).
279. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348. Nassar also pointed out that the 1991 Act overruled the part of
Price Waterhouse where the plurality, Justice White, and Justice O’Connor agreed that if a Title VII
plaintiff proves that her employer made an adverse employment decision partly for an impermissible
reason and partly for a permissible reason, the employer could defeat the plaintiff’s claim if it proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision had the impermissible
reason played no role in the decision. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
280. Id. at 349–50 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)).
281. Id. at 350–51 (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 174–75 n.2, 177 n.3, 179).
282. Id. (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 178 n.5).
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The Nassar Court held that because § 2000e-3(a)’s language is not
meaningfully different from the language in 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), which
is the ADEA’s prohibition on age discrimination,283 a plaintiff pressing a
§ 2000e-3(a) claim has to prove the same thing a plaintiff pressing an
ADEA claim has to prove, i.e., she has to prove that “but for” an
impermissible reason, her employer would not have discriminated against
her, and proving “but for” causation means proving the impermissible
reason was the reason for the discrimination.284After recounting its
interpretive history of the “because of” language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a), which is Title VII’s status discrimination provision, and the “because
of” language in the ADEA, the Court turned to what the “because of”
language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision,
means.285
Nassar further held that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), the 1991 Act’s
amendment to Title VII that codified Price Waterhouse’s “motivating
factor” theory, does not apply to § 2000e-3(a) retaliation discrimination,
but rather, it applies only to § 2000e-2(a) status discrimination.286 The
Court reached this conclusion by first finding that, the text of § 2000e2(m) makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, which indicates
Congress’s intent to limit the motivating factor theory to § 2000e-2(a)
status discrimination only;287 and second, the text of § 2000e-2(m) does
not say anything about retaliation discrimination, and therefore, it would
be improper to apply § 2000e-2(m)’s motivating factor theory to § 2000e3(a) retaliation claims.288 The Court further supported this conclusion by
noting that the 1991 Act added § 2000e-2(m) to § 2000e-2, which contains
Title VII’s prohibition on status discrimination, and the title of the section
of the 1991 Act that created § 2000e-2(m) referenced status discrimination
only and not retaliation.289 In sum, according to Nassar, the 1991 Act
enacted a “lessened causation standard” for § 2000e-2(a) status
discrimination, but it did not do so for § 2000e-3(a) retaliation

283. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee “because” she opposed an unlawful employment practice or made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing with respect to an
unlawful employment practice), with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (making it unlawful for an employer to
take an adverse employment action against an employee “because of” the employee’s age).
284. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352 (citing Gross 557 U.S. at 176).
285. Id. at 351–52.
286. Id. at 352–53.
287. Id.
288. Id. (first citing Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 378 (2013); and then citing Gardner v.
Collins, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 58, 93 (1829)).
289. Id. at 353 (citing Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (1991)).
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discrimination, despite the opportunity Congress had to enact the same
standard for both.290
Before Nassar, the Court read prohibitions on status discrimination
in other anti-discrimination statutes to also prohibit retaliation
discrimination even though those statutes did not contain an explicit antiretaliation provision. Thus, the Court had to explain why it interpreted
those statutes to prohibit something the text of those statutes did not
mention, yet it read Title VII, which does include an explicit antiretaliation provision, in such a parsimonious fashion.291 The Court’s
answer to this question was Title VII is a “precise, complex, and
exhaustive” statute, and thus it is not appropriate to interpret it as broadly
as the Court had interpreted other anti-discrimination statutes that
contained “broad, general bars on discrimination.”292 Put another way,
when Congress enacts a statutory prohibition on discrimination in a broad
and brief fashion, reading an anti-retaliation provision into that statutory
prohibition is acceptable.293 Conversely, when Congress enacts a detailed
anti-discrimination statute like Title VII, it is not acceptable to expand
§ 2000e-2(m)’s motivating factor theory beyond § 2000e-2(a) status
discrimination claims because if Congress intended § 2000e-2(m)’s
motivating factor theory to apply to § 2000e-3(a) retaliation
discrimination claims, it would have enacted statutory text to do so.294
Based on this reasoning, Nassar held that § 2000e-2(m)’s motiving
factor theory applies only to § 2000e-2(a) status discrimination claims,
and while the Court had previously read a prohibition on retaliation in
broadly worded anti-discrimination statutes, Title VII’s “detailed
structure” made it inappropriate to read it just as broadly. Thus, a Title VII
290. Id. at 357.
291. Id. at 354–55 (first citing Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479, 487 (2008) (29 U.S.C.
§ 633a(a), which prohibits age discrimination against federal employees who are at least forty years
old, does not have an anti-retaliation provision in it, but the Court nevertheless found that it does
prohibit retaliation against a person who opposes age discrimination against those employees); then
citing CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445, 452–53 (2008) (42 U.S.C. § 1981, which
prohibits racial discrimination in contracting, does not have an anti-retaliation provision in it, but the
Court nevertheless found that it does prohibit retaliation against a person who opposes racial
discrimination in contracting); then citing Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173,
179 (2005) (20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), which prohibits sex discrimination in any education program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance, does not have an anti-retaliation provision in it, but the
Court nevertheless found that it does prohibit retaliation against a person who opposes sex
discrimination in any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance); and then
citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 235 n.3, 237 (1969) (42 U.S.C. § 1982,
which prohibits racial discrimination in real and personal property transactions, does not have an antiretaliation provision in it, but the Court nevertheless found that it does prohibit retaliation against a
person who opposes racial discrimination in real and personal property transactions)).
292. Id. at 355–56.
293. Id. at 355–57.
294. Id.
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plaintiff who asserts a § 2000e-3(a) retaliation claim must prove that
retaliation was the reason her employer discriminated against her.295
Nassar said three times that a Title VII plaintiff who presses a § 2000e3(a) retaliation claim has to prove that retaliation was the but for cause of
the adverse employment act, and it said once that retaliation has to be the
reason for the adverse employment act.296
Nassar was a 5–4 decision.297 Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, Jr.298 Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.299
In Justice Ginsburg’s view, § 2000e-2(m)’s motivating factor
provision applies to “‘any employment practice,’” including retaliatory
practices.300 In response to the majority’s reasoning that Congress intended
to limit § 2000e-2(m)’s reach to § 2000e-2(a) status claims only, Justice
Ginsburg pointed out that when Congress enacted § 2000e-2(m), it created
an entirely new provision in Title VII, and “did not tie [§ 2000e-2(m)]
specifically to §§ 2000e-2(a) [through] 2000e-2(d), which [taken together,
prohibit] discrimination ‘because of’ race, color, religion, [sex], or
national origin.”301 She also took issue with the Court importing its
reasoning from Gross,302 an ADEA case, into Nassar, a Title VII case.303
In Gross, the Court declined to interpret the ADEA’s prohibition against
discrimination “because of” a person’s age the same way it interpreted
Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of” a person’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin because the ADEA and Title VII are
materially different.304 Gross, according to Justice Ginsburg, “took pains
to distinguish ADEA claims from Title VII claims,” yet in Nassar, a Title
VII case, the Court found the “. . . holding and analysis of [Gross,] [an
ADEA case] . . . instructive.”305
The employer prevailed in Gross because the ADEA does not impose
liability on an employer who makes an adverse employment decision
295. Id. at 359–60, 362–63.
296. Id. at 343 (the but for cause), 348 (the but for cause), 350 (the reason), 352 (the but for
cause) (emphases added).
297. Id. at 340–63 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., majority
opinion); id. at 363–86 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
298. Id. at 340–63 (majority opinion).
299. Id. at 363–86 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
300. Id. at 372.
301. Id. at 372.
302. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 167–92 (2009).
303. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 380–81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
304. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175 n.2.
305. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 380–81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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partly because of age and partly because of some non-age reason because,
unlike Title VII, the ADEA does not have a mixed motive provision.306
Put another way, the ADEA’s prohibition against age discrimination is too
different from Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin to interpret the two provisions
in a like fashion.307 The employer also prevailed in Nassar because
according to the majority, “there is no ‘meaningful textual difference’
between the ADEA’s use of [the word] ‘because’ and” Title VII’s use of
the word “because” in § 2000e-3(a).308 Justice Ginsburg described this
seeming contradiction as “heads the employer wins, tails the employee
loses[.]”309
She also pointed out that there is a principle of statutory
interpretation that says “identical phrases [that] appear in the same statute
[should] ordinarily bear a consistent meaning[,]” and according to that
principle, § 2000e-3(a)—Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision—should
have the same causation standard as § 2000e-2(a)—Title VII’s prohibition
against status discrimination—and because § 2000e-2(a) recognizes
mixed motive claims, so should § 2000e-3(a).310
Justice Ginsburg found the Court’s conclusion that the phrase
“because of” requires proof of “but for” causation unconvincing and
inconsistent with tort principles of causation.311 According to tort
principles of causation, when a defendant causes harm and does so for
more than one reason, requiring the party the defendant harmed to prove
“but for” causation is not proper.312 When multiple factors cause an injury,
and each factor standing alone would cause the same injury, modern tort
law allows a plaintiff to recover if she can show that either factor caused
her injury.313 The Nassar majority, however, held that if a Title VII
plaintiff asserts that her employer retaliated against her partly for an
impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason, she cannot
recover; a result that same majority described as “textbook tort law.”314
Justice Ginsburg objected to the majority’s framing of its holding as
“textbook tort law” because requiring “but for” causation when an
306. Gross, 557 U.S. at 169, 173–80.
307. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 381 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 380–81, 383–85.
312. Id. at 383 (first citing 1 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 27 cmt. a, at 385 (Am. L. Inst. 2005)
(there is “near universal agreement that the but-for standard is inappropriate when multiple sufficient
causes exist”); then citing Restatement of Torts § 9, cmt. b, at 18 (Am. L. Inst. 1934) (“legal cause is
a cause that is a ‘substantial’ factor in bringing about the harm”)).
313. Id. at 383 (citing 1 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 27 at 376–77 (Am. L. Inst. 2005)).
314. Id. at 346–47 (majority opinion).
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employer acts for multiple reasons can “demand the
impossible . . . [because it forces a finder of fact] . . . to probe into a purely
fanciful and unknowable state of affairs.”315 When evaluating why an
employer that acted with a mixed motive did what it did, one has to
“engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if the
employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been different.”316
Justice Ginsburg concluded her dissent by reminding the Court that the
eighty-eighth Congress “rejected an amendment that would have placed
the word ‘solely’ before ‘because of’” in what became Title VII’s
prohibition against discrimination “because of” race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.317
Ultimately, Nassar held there is no mixed motive theory available
for Title VII retaliation claims, which means a plaintiff whose employer
retaliated against her and did so with a mixed motive cannot obtain relief
under Title VII.318
F. Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of African American-Owned Media
Title VII and the ADEA are not the only anti-discrimination statutes
in which issues of causation arise. Section 1981 of Title 42 prohibits race
discrimination in contracting, and in Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of
African American-Owned Media, the Court held that a § 1981 plaintiff
must prove that race discrimination was “but for” cause of an adverse
contracting decision.319 Byron Allen, the black American owner of
Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), wanted Comcast, one of the
largest cable television operators in the United States of America, to carry
ESN’s content.320 Comcast refused, stating there was not enough demand
for ESN’s content, that there was not enough bandwidth to carry ESN’s
content, and that Comcast preferred content that ESN did not offer.321
ESN sued Comcast in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, asserting that Comcast discriminated against media
companies completely owned by black Americans.322 ESN sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a), which guarantees “[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to
315. Id. at 385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9
STAN. L. REV. 60, 67 (1956))).
316. Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Malone, supra note 315, at 67)).
317. Id. at 385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 2728, 13837–38 (1964)).
318. Id. at 352–60, 362–63.
319. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1009–21 (2020).
320. Id. at 1013.
321. Id.
322. Id.; Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., No. 2:15-cv-01239-TJHMAN, 2016 WL 11652073, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2016).
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make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”323 ESN
conceded that Comcast articulated legitimate business reasons for refusing
to carry ESN’s content, but asserted these reasons were a pretext to curry
“favor with the Federal Communications Commission.”324 The district
court dismissed ESN’s complaint, finding the complaint did not state a
plausible claim that “but for” racially discriminatory reasons, Comcast
would have agreed to carry ESN’s content.325
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court, finding that at the pleading stage, a § 1981(a) plaintiff
does not have to plead facts demonstrating that “but for” racial
discrimination, he or she would not have been harmed. Rather, if the
plaintiff shows that discrimination played “any role” in his or her being
harmed, he or she has plausibly stated a claim under § 1981(a).326
This contradicted a prior United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit opinion, which held that a § 1981 plaintiff has to prove
that “but for” racial discrimination, he or she would not have been
harmed.327 The Supreme Court agreed to hear Comcast in order to resolve
the circuit split on the question of whether a § 1981 plaintiff has to prove
“but for” racial discrimination, or whether he or she can instead prove that
racial discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the act that resulted in
harm.328
Comcast invoked Nassar’s language that “[i]t is ‘textbook tort law’
that a plaintiff seeking redress for a defendant’s legal wrong must prove
323. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1013. Section 1981 provides in full:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined
For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
324. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1013.
325. Id.; Comcast, 2016 WL 11652073, at *1.
326. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1013; Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media v. Charter Commc’ns,
Inc., 915 F.3d 617, 626 (9th Cir. 2019); Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., 743
F. App’x 106, 106–07 (9th Cir. 2018).
327. Bachman v. St. Monica’s Congregation, 902 F.2d 1259, 1262–63 (7th Cir. 1990).
328. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1014.
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but-for causation.”329 Section 1981, like Title VII with respect to
retaliation claims, and like the ADEA, has this same requirement, which
means a § 1981 plaintiff has to prove that “but for” racial discrimination,
he or she would not have been harmed.330 Comcast supported this
conclusion by adverting to a “neighboring section” to § 1981 that allowed
the criminal “prosecution of anyone who ‘depriv[es]’ a person of ‘any
right’ protected by the substantive provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 ‘on account of’ that person’s prior ‘condition of slavery’ or ‘by
reason of’ that person’s ‘color or race.’”331 To prove a violation of this
neighboring section, the government had to prove that the defendant acted
“on account of” or “by reason of” a person’s race, which Comcast said
requires proof of “but for” causation.332
Also, when the Court inferred “a private cause of action under
§ 1981,” it described the law as “‘affording a federal remedy against
discrimination . . . on the basis of race,’” which is language Comcast
described as “strongly suggestive of a but-for causation standard.”333 In
General Building Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania,334 the Court said that
§ 1981 prohibits discrimination “because of” race, which Comcast said is
language associated with “but for” causation.335
The same congressional act that enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 also
enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1982 which says, “All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property.”336 Among other things, § 1982 prohibits denying
a person the opportunity to acquire property “because of” race.337 Because
§ 1981 and § 1982 use “nearly identical language” and share a common
origin and purpose, the Court has interpreted both statutes similarly, and
because the Court has interpreted § 1982 to require “but for” causation,
the Comcast Court said the same is required for § 1981.338

329. Id. (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013)).
330. Id. (first citing Nassar, 570 U.S. at 346–47 (Title VII retaliation); and then citing Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009) (ADEA)).
331. Id. at 1015 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866)) (alteration in original).
332. Id. (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–77).
333. Id. at 1016 (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975)).
334. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 388 (1982).
335. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1016 (first quoting Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 388;
and then citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013)).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1016–17 (first citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78–79 (1917); then citing
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 419 (1968); and then citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 170–71 (1976)).
338. Id. at 1017.
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ESN urged the Court to recognize a cause of action under § 1981 if
a plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant acted with a mixed motive.339
Put another way, ESN wanted the Court to take the “‘motivating factor’
causation test found in Title VII” and apply it to § 1981.340 The Court
rejected ESN’s argument for two reasons.341 First, the text of § 1981 does
not include a motivating factor provision like the text of Title VII does.342
Second, in 1991, Congress amended Title VII and § 1981, and in so doing,
it added the motivating factor language to Title VII, but it did not add the
same or similar language to § 1981.343 When Congress amends one statute
using certain language and another statute using different language, the
Court assumes the different language implies a difference in meaning.344
ESN next argued that § 1981(b)’s prohibition on racial
discrimination in contracting includes prohibiting racial discrimination in
the “making” of contracts, which ESN asserted “guarantees not only the
right to equivalent contractual outcomes (a contract with the same final
terms), but also the right to an equivalent contracting process (no extra
hurdles on the road to securing that contract).”345 In light of this, ESN
argued that “a motivating factor causation test fits more logically than the
traditional but-for test.”346
Comcast responded that § 1981 only prohibits racially
discriminatory outcomes, which it said is the right to contract, the right to
sue, the right to be a party, and the right to give evidence.347 In light of
this, Comcast argued, § 1981 “focus[es] on contractual outcomes (not
processes) [and therefore] is more consistent with the traditional but-for
test of causation.”348
The Court did not decide whether § 1981 prohibits racial
discrimination in contracting outcomes only, or whether § 1981 also
339. Id. at 1014.
340. Id. at 1017–18.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1017. Title VII’s motivating factor language is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
Congress enacted § 2000e-2(m) as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a),
105 Stat. 1075 (1991).
343. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1017–18. When Congress amended § 1981 as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, it added what is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). Pub. L.
No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071-1072 (1991).
344. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1018 (first citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 17475 (2009); and then citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. The United States appeared in the case in support of Comcast and made this argument.
Id. at 1012, 1018. The United States went so far as to argue that an “employer could ‘refus[e] to
consider applications’ [for employment] from black applicants ” and not violate § 1981. Id. at 1020
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
348. Id. at 1018 (majority opinion).

2021]

Cause for Concern or Cause for Celebration?

509

prohibits racial discrimination in contracting processes too, because the
question of whether a § 1981 plaintiff is deprived of a right is distinct from
whether a § 1981 plaintiff has established causation, and Comcast held
that a § 1981 plaintiff has to establish “but for” causation.349
Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the opinion in Comcast.350 Chief Justice
John Roberts, Jr., Justices Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, Samuel
Alito, Jr., Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh joined the
opinion in full.351 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the opinion except
for the sole footnote in the opinion.352
Justice Ginsburg agreed that a § 1981 plaintiff has to prove “but for”
racial discrimination.353 She wrote separately to address Comcast’s
argument that § 1981 only prohibits racial discrimination in contracting
outcomes and does not apply to racial discrimination in the contracting
process.354 If Comcast’s view were established law, according to Justice
Ginsburg, “a lender would not violate § 1981 [if it] require[ed] prospective
borrowers to provide one reference letter if they are white and five if they
are black.”355 Likewise, an employer would not violate § 1981 if it
“reimburse[ed] expenses for white interviewees but require[ed] black
applicants to pay their own way.”356 The United States agreed with
Comcast’s arguments, and went so far as to argue that an employer would
not violate § 1981 even if it “‘refus[ed] to consider applications’ from

349. Id. at 1018 n.*, 1019.
350. Id. at 1012.
351. Id.
352. Id.; id. at 1019–21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The
sole footnote in the majority opinion says:
The concurrence proceeds to offer a view on the nature of the right, while
correctly noting that the Court reserves the question for another day. We reserve
the question because “we are a court of review, not of first view,” Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n.7 [] (2005), and do not normally strain to
address issues that are less than fully briefed and that the district and appellate
courts have had no opportunity to consider. Such restraint is particularly
appropriate here, where addressing the issue is entirely unnecessary to our
resolution of the case.
Id. at 1018. n.*.
353. Id. at 1019–20 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Ginsburg reminded the Court that she had previously posited “that a strict but-for causation standard
is ill suited to discrimination cases and [is] inconsistent with tort principles.” Id. at 1019–20 n.* (citing
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 383–85 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). She
did concede, however, that Nassar established “but for” causation “as a ‘default rul[e]’” in federal
anti-discrimination statutes. Id. at 1019–20 n.* (citing Nassar, 570 U.S. at 347).
354. Id. at 1019–21.
355. Id. at 1020.
356. Id.
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black applicants at all.”357 Justice Ginsburg said this view could not “be
squared with the statute” because the “equal ‘right . . . to
make . . . contracts’ . . . is an empty promise” if one does not have an
“equal opportunit[y] to present or receive offers and negotiate over
terms.”358
She also said that § 1981 “covers the entirety of the contracting
process”
as reflected in § 1981(b) defining the phrase “‘make and enforce contracts’
to ‘includ[e] the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship.’”359 Congress added § 1981(b)
to § 1981 in the 1991 Act in order to prohibit racial discrimination in “all
phases and incidents of the contractual relationship.”360
Justice Ginsburg warned the Court that Comcast’s argument that
§ 1981 does not prohibit racial discrimination in the contract formation
process was an “invit[ation]” for the Court to repeat the error it made in
Patterson v. McClean Credit Union when it held that “the right to ‘make’
a contract ‘extend[ed] only to the formation of a contract,’ and the right to
‘enforce’ it encompassed only ‘access to legal process.’”361 Patterson also
held that § 1981 does not apply to conduct that occurs after the contract is
formed, which meant § 1981 did not apply to racial harassment that
occurred after the formation of an employment contract.362
Congress overruled Patterson in the 1991 Act when it amended
§ 1981 by adding § 1981(b).363 As a result of the 1991 Act’s amendment
to § 1981, racial discrimination that occurs after the formation of a contract
violates § 1981 “because the right to ‘make and enforce’ a contract
includes the manner in which the contract is carried out[,]” and in Justice
Ginsburg’s view, that same principle should apply to racial discrimination
in the process of making the contract.364 Justice Ginsburg concluded her
concurrence by saying that if Comcast did engage in racial discrimination
357. Id. at 1018; id. at 1020 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21, Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at
1009 (No. 18-1171), 2019 WL 3889653).
358. Id. at 1020 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
359. Id. (alteration in original) ((quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)).
360. Id. (first quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 302 (1994); and then
quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 37 (1991)).
361. Id. at 1020–21 (alteration in original) (quoting Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 176–78, 181 (1989)).
362. Id. at 1021 (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 178–79 ).
363. Id. at 1021 (citing CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)). When
Congress amended § 1981 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it added what is now codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071-1072 (1991).
364. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1021 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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during the contract formation process, it should not “escape liability,” but
because the Court reserved the issue of whether § 1981 prohibits racial
discrimination during the contract formation process “for consideration on
remand,” she joined the Court’s opinion.365
At this point, it might be helpful to recapitulate the Court’s “because
of,” “motivating factor,” and “but for” causation analyses from Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins in 1989366 through Comcast in 2020.367
In Price Waterhouse, six Justices agreed that if a Title VII plaintiff
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that her employer made a
mixed motive adverse employment decision, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the employer to prove by preponderance of the evidence that the
employer would have made the same decision had the impermissible
reason played no role in its adverse employment decision.368
The 1991 Act codified this aspect of Price Waterhouse and added 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m),369 which is Title VII’s “motivating factor”
provision, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g)(2)(B), which is Title VII’s
provision that grants limited declaratory relief and limited injunctive relief
to a plaintiff who proves her employer made an adverse employment
decision partly for an impermissible reason and partly for a permissible
reason, but her employer also proves the employer would have made the
same decision had the impermissible reason played no role in its
decision.370
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Court held a Title VII plaintiff
who asserts her employer acted with a mixed motive can prove her case
with direct evidence or with circumstantial evidence.371
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Court held that the
ADEA does not recognize a mixed motive theory, which means a plaintiff
cannot pursue an age discrimination claim under the ADEA if her
employer made an adverse employment decision partly for age-related
reasons and partly for non-age-related reasons.372 Under the ADEA, a
plaintiff has to prove that age was the reason for an adverse employment
decision, not simply a reason.373

365. Id.
366. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
367. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1009.
368. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259–60 (White, J., concurring);
id. at 261, 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
369. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (1991).
370. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b)(3), 105 Stat. 1075-1076 (1991).
371. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003).
372. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 169–70, 173–75, 177–78, 180 (2009).
373. Id. at 176–78, 180.
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In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the
Court held Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a),
does not recognize a mixed motive theory, which means a plaintiff cannot
pursue a retaliation claim under Title VII if her employer retaliated against
her partly for retaliatory reasons and partly for non-retaliatory reasons.374
Nassar described Title VII’s motivating factor provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m), as having a “lessened causation standard” than the “but for”
causation standard required by Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, which
means under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, a plaintiff has to prove
that retaliation was the reason for an adverse employment decision, not
simply a reason.375
And in Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of African American-Owned
Media, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not recognize a mixed
motive theory, which means a plaintiff cannot pursue a § 1981
discrimination claim if the defendant made an adverse contracting decision
partly for racially discriminatory reasons and partly for non-discriminatory
reasons.376 Under § 1981, a plaintiff has to prove that racial discrimination
was the reason for an adverse contracting decision, not simply a reason.377
II. BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY
In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court consolidated three
cases in order to decide whether Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination makes it illegal to terminate a person’s employment for
being gay or transgender.378
In the first case, Gerald Bostock worked as a child welfare advocate
for Clayton County, Georgia.379 After ten years of employment, Mr.
Bostock started participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly
thereafter, his employer terminated his employment “for conduct
‘unbecoming’ a county employee.”380 Mr. Bostock sued his employer for
sex discrimination under Title VII in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia, which dismissed his case for failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted.381 Mr. Bostock appealed to

374. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352–60, 362–63 (2013).
375. Id. at 348–52, 357.
376. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014–19 (2020).
377. Id.
378. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737–38 (2020).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964, 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and that court
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of his case.382
In the second case, Donald Zarda worked for Altitude Express in the
State of New York as a skydiving instructor.383 When Mr. Zarda disclosed
that he was gay, Altitude Express terminated his employment.384 He sued
Altitude Express for sex discrimination under New York state law and for
sex discrimination under Title VII in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York.385 The district court dismissed Mr.
Zarda’s Title VII sex discrimination claim and the state law sex
discrimination claim proceeded to trial, but the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Altitude Express.386 Mr. Zarda appealed the dismissal of his Title
VII sex discrimination claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and a panel of that court affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of his Title VII sex discrimination claim.387
The Second Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc to reconsider its
precedents holding that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination does
not include discrimination based on sexual orientation.388 The en banc
court overruled its precedent and held that Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.389
382. Id. at 964–65.
383. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
384. Id.
385. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 79–84 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam), reh’g en banc
granted, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
386. Id. at 79–80. Mr. Zarda died before the trial, and Melissa Zarda and William Allen Moore,
Jr., co-independent executors of Mr. Zarda’s estate, replaced him as the plaintiff in his case. Id. at 79
n.1.
387. Id. at 81–84.
388. Zarda 883 F.3d at 108. The cases the Second Circuit reconsidered are Dawson v. Bumble
& Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–23 (2d Cir. 2005), and Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir.
2000). Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108. The en banc judges were Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann and Judges
Dennis G. Jacobs, José Alberto Cabranes, Rosemary S. Pooler, Robert David Sack, Reena Raggi, Peter
W. Hall, Debra Ann Livingston, Gerard E. Lynch, Denny Chin, Raymond Joseph Lohier, Jr., Susan
Laura Carney, and Christopher Fitzgerald Droney. Id. at 106.
389. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108, 111–32. The decision was not unanimous; in fact, it was far from
it. Id. at 106. Chief Judge Katzmann wrote the majority opinion, and Judges Hall, Chin, Carney, and
Droney joined that opinion in full. Id. Judge Jacobs joined Parts I and III.B.3 and wrote a concurring
opinion. Id. at 132–35 (Jacobs, J., concurring).
Judge Pooler joined all but part II.B.1.b. Id. at 106.
Judge Sack joined Parts I, II.A, II.B.3, and II.C and wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 135–36 (Sack,
J., concurring).
Judge Lohier joined Parts I, II.A, and II.B.1.a and wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 136–37 (Lohier,
J., concurring).
Judge Cabranes concurred in the judgment only. Id. at 135 (Cabranes, J., concurring in the judgment).
Judge Lynch wrote a dissent that Judge Livingston joined as to Parts I, II, and III. Id. at 137–67 (Lynch
& Livingston, JJ., dissenting).
Judge Livingston wrote a dissent. Id. at 167–69 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
Judge Raggi wrote a dissent. Id. at 169 (Raggi, J., dissenting).
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In the third case, Aimee Stephens worked for R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes (Harris) in Garden City, Michigan.390 When Ms. Stephens
started working for Harris, she “presented as male[,] but two years
[later,] . . . she [started receiving] treatment for despair and loneliness[,
and] [u]ltimately, clinicians diagnosed her with gender dysphoria and
recommended that she [start] living as a [female].”391 Four years after that
recommendation, “Ms. Stephens wrote a letter to . . . [Harris, stating] that
she planned to ‘live and work full-time as a [female]’.”392 Harris then
terminated her employment.393
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued394
Harris in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, asserting that Harris’s termination of Ms. Stephens for being
transgender constituted sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.395 The
district court dismissed that claim.396 The EEOC appealed the case to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and that court
reversed the district court, finding that Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination prohibits discrimination against a person for being
transgender.397
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve the circuit
split on the question of whether Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination makes it illegal to terminate a person’s employment for
being gay or transgender.398 In answering this ultimate question, the Court
had to decide the scope of what it means to discriminate “because of”
sex.399 None of the three cases in Bostock involved what the Court in
Nassar called the “lessened causation standard” that applies in Title VII
mixed motive cases where a plaintiff can obtain limited relief if she proves
that her employer acted partly for an impermissible reason and partly for

390. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Title VII authorizes the EEOC to bring a civil action against a non-governmental party. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The aggrieved person has the right to intervene in such a case. Id. Ms. Stephens
intervened in the case when it reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit because
of her “concern that changes in policy priorities within the [federal] government might prevent the
EEOC from fully representing [her] interests in [the] case.” EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 570 (6th Cir. 2018). Ms. Stephens died before the Supreme Court decided
Bostock. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
395. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 840–70 (E.D.
Mich. 2016).
396. Id. at 840–42.
397. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 571–600.
398. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
399. Id. at 1739.
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a permissible reason, and her employer proves that it would have made the
same decision had the impermissible reason played no role at all.400
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar and
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Court said the language in Title
VII that prohibits employers from making adverse employment decisions
“because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”401 means
employers cannot make such decisions “by reason of” or “on account of”
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, which means a Title VII
plaintiff who asserts that her employer discriminated against her “because
of” a reason that Title VII prohibits must prove that “but for” the employer
acting for a prohibited reason, she would not have been harmed.402
Bostock described “but for” causation as “a sweeping
standard . . . [because] [o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes.”403 For
example, if a driver runs a red light and another driver fails to use a turn
signal at an intersection and the drivers collide, both drivers are a “but for”
cause of the collision.404 And according to Bostock,
[w]hen it comes to Title VII, . . . the traditional but-for causation
standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing
some other factor that contributed to its [adverse] employment
decision.405 So long as the plaintiff’s sex [or race, color, religion,
or national origin,] was one but-for cause of that decision, that is
enough to trigger the law.406
Congress could have written Title VII in a way to require a plaintiff
to prove that her employer made an adverse employment decision “solely
because of” or “primarily because of” a reason prohibited by Title VII, but
that is not the law Congress wrote.407 In fact, in the 1991 Act, Congress
400. Id. at 1739–40; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013).
401. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
402. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 346, 350; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
403. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739. In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,
Justice Gorsuch, the author of the majority opinion in Bostock, wrote, “As every first year law student
learns, a but-for causation test isn’t the most demanding. At a high level of abstraction, one might say
any event in the world would not have happened ‘but for’ events far and long removed.” Ford Motor
Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1034 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring
in the judgment). In Welch v. State, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that “but for”
causation is “too imprecise for a rule of causation” in criminal cases where proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is required and illustrated the point by saying, “Mankind might still be in Eden, but for Adam’s
biting an apple.” Welch v. State, 235 So. 2d 906, 907 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970).
404. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 211–12 (2014)).
405. Id.
406. Id. (first citing Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211–12; and then citing Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350).
407. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 525 and 16 U.S.C. § 511 as examples of statutes where Congress
used the phrase “solely because of,” and citing 22 U.S.C. § 2688 as an example of a statute where
Congress used the phrase “primarily because of”). Use of the phrase “‘solely’ to indicate that actions
taken ‘because of’ the confluence of multiple factors do not violate the law.” Id.
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amended Title VII to add § 2000e-2(m), its “motivating factor” provision,
which does not require proof of “but for” causation, but instead has a
“lessened causation standard.”408 The addition of § 2000e-2(m), however,
does not mean that a plaintiff who relies instead on § 2000e-2(a) and its
requirement of proof of “but for” causation has to prove that her employer
made an adverse employment decision “solely because of” or “primarily
because of” a reason prohibited by Title VII.409 As long as the plaintiff
proves that her employer made the adverse employment decision for a
reason that is prohibited by Title VII and that reason is a “but for” reason,
it does not matter that other reasons also played a role in the decision.410
Bostock contrasted the “but for” causation requirement of § 2000e2(a) with the “lessened causation” standard of § 2000e-2(m) to make the
point that Title VII provides two paths to relief.”411 One path is § 2000e2(a), which requires proof of “but for” causation, and the other path is
§ 2000e-2(m), which requires a “lessened causation standard.”412
However, Bostock made a point of saying that “nothing in [its] analysis
depends on the motivating factor test [from § 2000e-2(m)].”413 Bostock’s
statement that “the traditional but-for causation standard [does not] mean[]
[that] a defendant can[] avoid liability just by citing some other factor that
contributed to [the adverse employment act]” appears to be a recognition
of what United States Senator Clifford Philip Case, Jr., of New Jersey said
during the debate on Title VII: “If anyone ever had an action that was
motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal from any I
know of.”414
Bostock also appears to recognize that Title VII authorizes two mixed
motive theories, one under § 2000e-2(a) and one under § 2000e-2(m).415
If an employer makes an adverse employment decision partly for an
impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason, and the
employee pursues a claim under § 2000e-2(a), the employee can prevail if
she proves that “but for” the impermissible reason, the employer would

408. Id. at 1739–40 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat.
1075 (1991)). On February 10, 1964, the United States House of Representatives rejected a proposed
amendment that would have placed the word “solely” before the phrase “because of,” and the United
States Senate rejected the proposed amendment on June 15, 1964. 110 Cong. Rec. 2728, 13837–38
(1964).
409. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40.
410. Id. at 1739 (first citing Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211–12; and then citing Nassar, 570 U.S. at
350).
411. Id. at 1739–40.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 1740.
414. 110 CONG. REC. 13837 (1964).
415. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40.
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not have made the adverse employment decision.416 This requires that the
employee to prove the impermissible reason was decisive, which means if
one removes the impermissible reason from the decision making process,
the ultimate decision would change.417
On the other hand, if an employer makes an adverse employment
decision partly for an impermissible reason and partly for a permissible
reason, and the employee pursues a claim under § 2000e-2(m), the
employee does not need to prove that “but for” the impermissible reason,
the employer would not have made the adverse employment decision.
Rather, she just has to prove that the employer was motivated by the
impermissible reason when it made the decision.418 Under this latter mixed
motive theory, the employee does not need to prove that the impermissible
reason was decisive, only that it played a part in the adverse employment
decision.419
The “multiple but-for cause”420 language from Bostock differs from
the language the Court used in Nassar and Gross, which rejected the
availability of a mixed motive or motivating factor theory in Title VII
retaliation cases and ADEA cases respectively, and both of which said a
combined ten times that plaintiffs in Title VII retaliation cases and ADEA
cases have to prove that an impermissible reason was “the but for cause”
or “the reason” their employers made adverse employment decisions.421
Nassar’s and Gross’s rejections of the mixed motive or motivating factor
theory in Title VII retaliation cases and ADEA cases respectively, coupled
with both cases’ use of the definite article “the” rather than the indefinite
article “a” in describing what proving “but for” causation entails, suggest
that those two decisions intended to require the plaintiff to prove that an
impermissible reason was the “sole” or “primary” reason the employer
made an adverse employment decision.422 Justice Ginsburg, who wrote a
dissent in Nassar that Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined, and
Justice Stevens, who wrote a dissent in Gross that Justices Souter,

416. Id.
417. Id. at 1739 (“[A] but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome
changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”).
418. Id. at 1739–40.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 1739.
421. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343, 348, 350, 352 (2013) (using
phrases like the but for cause; the reason; and the but for cause) (emphases added); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77, 177 n.4, 178, 180 (2009) (using phrases like the reason and the but
for cause) (emphases added).
422. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343, 348, 350, 352; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176, 177 n.4, 178, 180.
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Ginsburg, and Breyer joined, all thought that was precisely what those
decisions required.423
Bostock, however, is fairly clear a plaintiff’s proof of “but for”
causation is not as onerous as Nassar and Gross suggest it is; instead of
having to prove that an impermissible reason was the “sole” or “primary”
reason the employer made an adverse employment decision, the plaintiff
has to show that an impermissible reason was “a but for” reason, not “the
but for” reason.424 There are several passages from Bostock that support
this view.425
In stating that Title VII protects males and females from sex
discrimination equally, the Court used the following hypothetical:
So an employer who fires a woman, Hannah, because she is
insufficiently feminine and also fires a man, Bob, for being
insufficiently masculine may treat men and women as groups more
or less equally. But in both cases the employer fires an individual in
part because of sex. Instead of avoiding Title VII exposure, this
employer doubles it.426

The Court also said that the ordinary public meaning of Title VII’s
language at the time of its adoption announced the following
“straightforward rule”:
An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an
individual employee based in part on sex. It doesn’t matter if other
factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision. And it
doesn’t matter if the employer treated women as a group the same
423. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 2728, 13837–38
(1964)) (“When Title VII was enacted, Congress considered and rejected an amendment that would
have placed the word ‘solely’ before ‘because of [the complainant’s] race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.’ Senator Case, a prime sponsor of Title VII, commented that a ‘sole cause’ standard
would render the Act ‘totally nugatory.’ Life does not shape up that way, the Senator suggested,
commenting ‘[i]f anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind
of animal from any I know of.’”) (internal citations omitted); Gross, 557 U.S. at 183 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“We were no doubt aware that dictionaries define ‘because of’ as ‘by reason of’ or ‘on
account of.’ Contrary to the majority’s bald assertion, however, this does not establish that the term
denotes but-for causation. The dictionaries the Court cites do not, for instance, define ‘because of’ as
‘solely by reason of’ or ‘exclusively on account of.’ In Price Waterhouse, we recognized that the
words ‘because of’ do not mean ‘solely because of,’ and we held that the inquiry ‘commanded by the
words’ of the statute was whether gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision.”
(internal citations omitted)).
424. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (first citing Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 211–12
(2014); and then citing Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350) (“When it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the
traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some
other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision. So long as the plaintiff’s sex was
one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law.”).
425. Id. at 1741–46, 1748.
426. Id. at 1741 (second emphasis added).
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when compared to men as a group. If the employer intentionally relies
in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge
the employee—put differently, if changing the employee’s sex would
have yielded a different choice by the employer—a statutory
violation has occurred.427

“[I]f an employer intentionally relies in part on an individual
employee’s sex when” making an adverse employment decision, that
employer violates Title VII.428 For example, if an employer has two
employees, one male and one female, and both employees are attracted to
men, if the employer terminates the employment of the male “for no other
reason other than the fact that he is attracted to men,” the employer treats
the male employee differently than the female employee based in part on
the male employee’s sex, and reliance on that employee’s sex is a “but for”
cause of the termination.429 And it does not matter in this example that the
employer considered other factors in the decision to terminate the male
employee.430 To further illustrate this point, consider an employer that
terminates the employment of any male employee who is a fan of the
“wrong” sports team.431 That employer terminated the employment of
male employees “‘because of sex’” if the employer would not have
terminated the employment of female employees who are fans of the same
sports team.432
The same holds true for an employer that terminates the employment
of an employee because the employee is gay or transgender.433 In that case,
the employee’s “sex and something else (the sex to which the [employee]
is attracted or [the sex] with which the [employee] identifies)” are in play,
but the employer would still violate Title VII if “but for” the employee’s
sex, the employer would not have terminated the employee’s
employment.434 If an employer terminates the employment of a female
employee and a male employee because both defy traditional sex
stereotypes, that employer had doubled its Title VII liability, and the same
holds true if that same employer terminates the employment of both
employees for being gay or transgender.435 At bottom, if an employer takes
an adverse employment action against an employee because that employee
is gay or transgender, that employer intentionally discriminates against
427. Id. (emphases added).
428. Id. (emphasis added).
429. Id.
430. Id. at 1742.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 1742–43.
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that employee “in part because of sex,” and that is prohibited by Title
VII.436
Bostock is not the only Supreme Court case that used language
suggesting that an employer that makes an adverse employment decision
partly for an impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason
made that decision “because of” the impermissible reason if the
impermissible reason was decisive.437
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the employer did not hire
women with young children but did hire men with young children and
argued that it did not engage in sex discrimination because it relied on
being the parent of young children as part of the reason for its employment
policy.438 The Court rejected the employer’s argument because “an
employer [that] discriminates intentionally against [a person] . . . in part
because of sex” nevertheless violates Title VII.439 Sex was not the only
reason the employer did not hire women with young children, “or maybe
even the main [reason], but [sex] was one but-for cause[,] and that was
enough” to run afoul of Title VII.440
In Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, the
employer required female employees to make larger contributions to their
pension plans than male employees made to their pension plans because,
on average, women on live longer than men, which made funding female
employees’ pension plans more expensive than funding male employees’
pension plans.441 Notwithstanding the actuarial accuracy of the average
life expectancy of women compared to the average life expectancy of men,
the Court still found that the employer violated Title VII because “[a]n
employer’s intentional discrimination on the basis of sex is not more
permissible when it is prompted by some further intention (or motivation),
even one as prosaic as seeking to account for actuarial tables.”442
Turning back to Bostock, when an employer takes an adverse
employment action against an employee because that employee is gay or
transgender, that employer “necessarily and intentionally discriminates
436. Id. at 1743 (citing Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 135 (2d Cir. 2018)
(Cabranes, J., concurring in the judgment)) (“This is a straightforward case of statutory construction.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’ . . . [S]exual
orientation is a function of his sex. Discrimination . . . because of . . . sexual orientation therefore is
discrimination because of his sex, and is prohibited by Title VII. That should be the end of the
analysis.”).
437. Id. (first citing L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707–08, 711 (1978);
and then citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 542–44 (1971) (per curiam)).
438. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
439. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743.
440. Id. at 1745.
441. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704–05.
442. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
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against that [employee] in part because of sex[,]” and violates Title VII in
the process.443 And Bostock said that “the [employee’s] sex need not be
the sole or primary cause of the employer’s adverse action.”444
This is the case even if another factor, “such as the sex the [employee] is
attracted to or presents as[,] might also be at work, or even play a more
important role in the employer’s decision.”445 An employer that takes an
adverse employment action against an employee in part because that
employee is gay or transgender violates Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination even if that employer takes the same adverse employment
action against all of its male gay or transgender employees and all of its
female gay or transgender employees.446
Liability under Title VII does not “turn[] on the
employer’s . . . further intentions (or motivations) for its conduct beyond
sex discrimination.”447 It is not possible for an employer to discriminate
against a person for being gay or transgender without discriminating in
part because of that person’s sex.448 Bostock stated explicitly that Title VII
does not require that a plaintiff prove that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was the sole or primary reason for an employer’s adverse
employment decision. 449
And because a result can have more than one “but for” cause, if race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin is decisive in an employer’s adverse
employment decision, that employer is liable under Title VII even if other
factors besides race, color, religion, sex, or national origin contributed to
the adverse employment decision.”450
Bostock said eight times that if an employer considers sex in making
an adverse employment decision, and the ultimate decision would have
been different had sex not been considered, sex is a “but for” cause of that
decision even if the employer considered other factors too in making the
decision.451 Bostock said ten times that an employer violates Title VII if it
intentionally takes an adverse employment action against an employee in

443. Id. at 1744.
444. Id. (emphasis added).
445. Id. (emphasis added).
446. See id.
447. Id. at 1745–46.
448. Id. at 1746.
449. Id. at 1748.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 1739, 1741–46, 1748 (using phrases like other factor; further intention or motivation;
another factor; not the only factor; further intentions or motivations; other factors; two but-for factors,
and; different factors) (emphases added).
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part based on sex.452 And Bostock said five times that sex does not have to
be the sole or primary reason for the adverse employment decision.453
Bostock’s bottom line is taking an adverse employment action
against an employee because that employee is gay or transgender violates
Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination, even if other factors
played a role in that action and even if all female gay and transgender
employees and all male gay and transgender employees are subjected to
the same adverse action.454 And to the extent Nassar can be read to require
plaintiffs in ADEA and Title VII retaliation cases respectively to prove an
impermissible reason was the sole or primary reason for their employers’
adverse employment decisions, that reading is no longer operative in light
of Bostock.455
Bostock was a 6-to-3 decision.456 Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the
majority opinion, and Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. and Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan
joined it.457 Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent that Justice Clarence
Thomas joined.458 Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a dissent for himself
only.459
Justice Alito thought what the Court did was legislation, not judicial
interpretation of a statute.460 In his view, when Congress enacted Title VII,
the prohibition on sex discrimination did not include sexual orientation or
gender identity.461 Additionally, since 1975, members of Congress
introduced bills to add sexual orientation to race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin as a prohibited basis upon which to make an adverse
employment decision, and none of those bills passed both houses of
Congress. According to Justice Alito, this means Congress knew that Title
VII as originally enacted did not cover discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity, and the repeated rejection of attempts to
452. Id. at 1741, 1743–44, 1746, (using phrases like in part because of sex; in part on sex; in
part on an individual employee’s sex; in part on the employee’s sex; in part because of sex; in part
because of that individual’s sex; in part because of an applicant’s sex, and; in part because of the
affected individuals’ sex) (emphases added).
453. Id. at 1739, 1744–45, 1748 (stating that Congress did not add “solely” or “primarily” before
“because of”; sex need not be the sole or primary cause; sex was not the only factor or the main factor,
but is was one but-for cause; Title VII does not require that sex be the sole or primary reason; and sex
does not have to be the sole or primary cause for Title VII liability to follow).
454. Id. at 1739–46, 1748, 1754.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 1736.
457. Id. at 1737–54.
458. Id. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting).
459. Id. at 1822 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
460. Id. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting). He also considered the Court’s discussion of causation
“beside the point” and “so much smoke.” Id. at 1757, 1775.
461. Id. at 1754–55.
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amend Title VII to include discrimination on those bases means Congress
did not intend Title VII to prohibit discrimination on those bases.462
He pointed out that in 1964, the year Congress enacted Title VII,463
dictionaries from that time period defined “sex” to mean male or female,
not sexual orientation or gender identity.464 He said “[t]he same is true of
current definitions[.]”465 When Congress enacted Title VII, “the United
States military had a blanket policy of refusing to enlist gays or lesbians,
and under this policy for years thereafter, applicants for enlistment were
required to complete a form that asked whether they were
‘homosexual.’”466
He commented on the far-reaching consequences of “interpreting
discrimination because of ‘sex’ to encompass discrimination because of
sexual orientation or gender identity[.]”467 He provided an illustrative list
of vexing issues he thought the Court failed to adequately address and
described its failure to address those issues as “irresponsible.”468 He cited
over 100 federal statutes that “prohibit discrimination because of sex[,]”
and posited that it would have been better to provide Congress with the
opportunity to “consider competing interests and . . . [find] a way of
accommodating at least some of them.”469 The Court’s intervention, in his
view, “greatly impeded—and perhaps effectively ended—any chance of a
bargained legislative resolution.”470 He concluded his dissent with a
warning that the Court’s decision would “threaten freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, and personal privacy and safety.”471
Justice Kavanaugh faulted the Court for interpreting Title VII’s
textual prohibition on sex discrimination literally rather than according to
462. Id. at 1754–56.
463. Congress enacted Title VII on July 2, 1964. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
Title VII, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-266 (1964). What is now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2,
2000e-3, 2000e-5, and 2000e-6 went into effect on July 2, 1964; however, the remainder of the law
went into effect on July 2, 1965. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, §§ 716(a),
716(b), 78 Stat. 241, 266 (1964).
464. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756–57 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito attached an appendix to
his dissent that he denominated Appendix A that consisted of “the full definitions of ‘sex’ in the
unabridged dictionaries in use in the 1960s.” Id. at 1756, 1784–89 (Alito, J., dissenting).
465. Id. at 1765–66. Justice Alito attached an appendix to his dissent that he denominated
Appendix B that consisted of “current definitions of ‘sex’[.]” Id. at 1766, 1790–91.
466. Id. at 1758–59. Justice Alito attached an appendix to his dissent that he denominated
Appendix D that consisted of a list of United States military forms that require a person to disclose
whether he or she is gay. Id. at 1759, 1796–1822.
467. Id. at 1778.
468. Id. at 1778–84.
469. Id. at 1778. Justice Alito attached an appendix to his dissent that he denominated Appendix
C that consisted of a list of federal statutes that prohibit discrimination because of sex. Id. at 1778,
1791–96.
470. Id. at 1778.
471. Id.
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the text’s ordinary meaning, and according to that ordinary meaning,
discriminating against a person for being gay or transgender is not
discrimination because of sex.472 He also chided for Court for usurping
Congress by “judicially rewriting” Title VII and short circuiting the
legislative process that appeared to be on its way to codifying protections
for gay and transgender persons against discrimination.473
Ultimately, Bostock held that discriminating against a person for
being gay or transgender is sex discrimination, and as far as Title VII is
concerned, an employer that does so is liable even if other reasons
informed the decision and even if sex was not the sole or primary reason
for the decision.474
CONCLUSION
After Bostock, there are now two mixed motive theories available
under Title VII: one where the impermissible motive was decisive, in
which case the plaintiff can prove “but for” causation and is eligible for
the full panoply of Title VII remedies, and one where the impermissible
motive was not decisive, in which case the plaintiff cannot prove “but for”
causation but is eligible for a limited form of declaratory and injunctive
relief.475
Before Bostock, if an employer acted with a mixed motive, the
plaintiff’s Title VII case was channeled into the motivating factor theory
and the limited remedies that theory provides.476 After Bostock, it is now
easier for a plaintiff whose employer acted with a mixed motive to prove
“but for” causation and receive the full panoply of Title VII remedies.477

472. Id. at 1822–33 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
473. Id. at 1833–37.
474. Id. at 1739–46, 1748, 1754 (majority opinion).
475. Id.
476. Univ. Of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343, 348, 350–52, 357 (2013).
477. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–46, 1748, 1754.

